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This dissertation includes three independent studies that jointly consider the role of non-
material factors, such as ideology and religion, in operational decisions of individuals and 
groups. It seeks to contribute to the vast scholarship on political contestation, which this 
dissertation conceptualizes broadly to include various forms of peaceful and violent political 
activism. The first two articles focus on terrorism as a violent form of political contestation. In 
the first study, I introduce a new dataset that includes over 25,000 observations and 
categorizes terrorist groups based on their ideology. I examine the impact of ideology on the 
terrorist groups’ tactic choices controlling for group age and the waves of terrorism, as 
theorized by Rapoport (2002). Using the same dataset, the second study examines the role of 
ideology on the terrorist groups’ target choice. Finally, the third study focuses on the role of 
religion and religiosity on various forms of peaceful political contestation. This dissertation finds 
evidence that tactic and target choices do vary by the ideology of the perpetrating group. It also 
finds that religions vary in their influence on the forms of political participation considered. 
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The three studies in this dissertation project, while written to stand alone, fit under a broader 
theme of political contestation. For the purpose of the dissertation, I conceptualize political 
contestation in a broad sense, to include both peaceful forms of participation, like joining a 
demonstration, and violent forms of political participation, specifically terrorism. Consistent 
with this understanding of political contestation, the first two studies focus on terrorism 
exemplifying the violence end of the spectrum of political contestation, whereas the third 
article explores mostly peaceful forms of political contention. All of the studies also speak to a 
need for careful examination of openly accessible data before its employment in research. The 
first study speaks to the variation in terrorist group types and how it influences terrorist groups’ 
operational decisions. I argue that ideology is a driving force that impacts how terrorist groups 
choose tactics, whether those are non-discriminate like bombings or whether they discriminate 
as in kidnappings. The second study is very closely related to the first, as it speaks to how 
different terrorist group types select their targets, for example whether they attack businesses 
or governments. In both the first and second study, I find that there is significant evidence to 
suggest that terrorist group’s ideology mitigates operational choices. The third study speaks to 
other forms of political participation, and it seeks to understand how religion mitigates 
decisions to participate in the political process.  
There are a number of goals that this dissertation project seeks to fulfill. First, it, introduces an 
improved and more reliable terrorism dataset. Second, it uses open source data to classify 
terrorist groups into various group types, based on their ideology, and provides descriptive 
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statistical evidence in support of the diversity among terrorist groups. Third, it presents 
theoretical explanations connecting terrorist group types and operational decisions. Fourth, it 
considers the role of religion and other social factors on various forms of political contestation. 
The three articles that form my dissertation project will jointly accomplish these goals.  
The basis of this dissertation is rooted in the conceptualization of political contestation. This 
dissertation takes the stance that political contestation varies greatly. Participating in a 
peaceful strike, signing a petition, or using violence as a means to alter the political landscape 
are all examples of political contestation. Given the variation in political regimes around the 
world, political participation is inevitably varied. In democracies, there are channels that allow 
for active political participation. Citizens of democratic nations may strike, boycott, and 
demonstrate publicly without the fear for their personal integrity and civil rights, while citizens 
in non-democracies or transitioning nations have less recourse to non-violent means of political 
participation. Terrorism is a means of political engagement. It is not only an option that 
perpetrators in non-democracies use, but it is an alternative for people who do not have access 
to other forms of participation, or who feel that their voices are not heard. To be clear, this 
study is not suggesting that terrorism is a legitimate, or even justified, means of political 
contestation. This study is suggesting that terrorists are seeking a political change, and that 
they have political goals.  
In the following paragraphs, this introduction will briefly introduce each of the articles. The 
questions, goals, and findings of each of the three articles will be discussed.  
Study 1: Terrorist Group-Types and Tactic Choice  
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Terrorism is a widely studied topic, but there are still many unanswered questions. The 
scholarship on terrorism and political violence has examined the conditions that facilitate 
terrorism, but it has not systematically examined the diversity among terrorist groups. This 
study differentiates between groups based on ideology, and then examines the impact of 
ideology on operational decisions, specifically tactic choice. Does ideology mitigate tactic 
choice? Is there variation among ideological group-types and their choice in tactic?  
This study posits that ideology is the key factor in operational decisions, but it also suggests that 
ideology is not the only factor. Capability and target audience are also mitigating factors that 
drive tactic choice. Groups need resources to survive, and they need a supportive target 
audience so that they may continue to get resources. Given that groups have varying 
ideologies, resources, and target audiences, I posit that it would be overly simplistic to think 
that groups would all make the same operational decisions under similar structural conditions. 
The results in this study do support my assertion, as statistical evidence supports the study’s 
key argument that there is diversity in tactic choice, by group-type.  
Furthermore, noting the possibility of change in this relationship across time, it purports to 
investigate whether transnational terrorist groups’ choice of tactic has varied according to the 
“waves of terrorism” identified by Rapoport (2002). Rapoport (2002) suggests that there are 
four distinct waves of terrorism1: (1) the anarchist wave in the 1880s, (2) the anti-colonial wave 
in the 1920s, (3) the new left wave of the 1960s, and (4) the religious wave beginning in 1979 
and lasting until today. Rapoport (2002) theorizes that the first three waves lasted 
                                                             
1 Although Kaplan (2010) disagrees, and suggests that we are currently experiencing the fifth wave, which is 
representative of a more extremist, xenophobic, and tribal version of terrorism  
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approximately 40 years, and that we may expect this current wave to also last that same 
amount of time. However, with the exponential developments in technology, one cannot 
expect this pattern to hold. Terrorist groups now have greater readily available resources in 
which they may recruit or fundraise. Not only does Rapoport (2002) suggest that there are four 
waves, but also that they are distinguished by the tactics used within each wave. He suggests 
that the first wave was riddled by bank robberies and assassinations, the second wave was also 
characterized by assassinations, the third wave consisted of hijacking, hostage taking, and 
kidnapping, while the fourth wave is characterized by bombings, hostage taking and 
assassinations. Although Rapoport (2002) does not test these assumptions, he makes a 
compelling argument using historical narratives. Given the limitation of the data in this study, 
only the presence of the third and fourth waves are examined, and there is some mixed 
evidence in support of Rapoport’s (2002) theory.  
Although this study is a step towards understanding terrorist actions, further development of 
this line of work may assist in producing effective counter-terrorism strategies. Finding patterns 
within different terrorist group types can help us understand, and eventually combat, terrorist 
organizations. Understanding how group ideology and group survival effect operational 
decisions can help us anticipate the use of specific tactics.   
Study 2: Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection 
Like the first study, this study seeks to answer whether ideology mitigates operational decisions 
of transnational terrorist groups, but this study focuses on target selection instead of tactic 
selection. This study also uses the same data as the first study. Target selection is a key 
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operational decision that groups make, and understanding the constraining factors that help 
determine the targets is imperative to counter terrorist strategies. The variation among groups, 
their motives, goals, and capabilities, mitigate their decisions, including their targets. This study 
seeks to provide evidence to convey that ideology alters choices, and by parsing out groups into 
types based on their ideology, this may become evident. Groups are divided into 
nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, religious, and environmental groups.   
Target selection has been a relatively understudied question in the terrorism literature, and in 
order to understand the relationship between operational decisions, like target choice, we need 
to further examine the question. Targets are only one aspect of terrorist operations, but it is an 
imperative one. Understanding whether ideology mitigates target choice has counter-terrorism 
and preparedness implications. If we can associate the likelihood of target selection by terrorist 
group’s type, then scholars can potentially anticipate and prevent future attacks.  
The targets examined in this study are comprised of six categories: (1) political, (2) civilian, (3) 
security, (4) business, (5) rival, and (6) infrastructure2. These categories will be further discussed 
in the data section, but they represent a broad range of terrorist targets.  
                                                             
2 Political targets include any domestic or international governmental targets, including a government 
building, government employees, government events, and foreign missions or embassies. Civilian 
targets include educational institutions such as schools or teachers, journalists and media entities, 
NGOs, private citizens and private property, religious institutions, and tourists. These targets are 
unrelated to a nation’s security apparatus. Security targets include attacks on the military or police. 
Business targets include any attacks on businesses, this includes attacks on business patrons. Rival 
targets are defined as other terrorist groups or non-state militias. Finally, infrastructure targets include 
attacks on food or water supplies, airports, maritime facilities like ports or ships, telecommunication 
infrastructure such as cell phone towers, transportation systems and utility facilities like oil pipelines or 




This study posits, and finds, that there is evidence to suggest that differences in groups’ 
ideologies do have an effect on target selection; an implication being that we need to continue 
to parse out ideology to further our understanding of terrorist actions. Mitigated by resources 
and opportunity, terrorist group ideology guides groups towards acts that are acceptable to 
their belief system. For example, I would not expect left wing groups to attack rival targets; left 
wing groups are generally revolutionary in nature and seek the change of a political system, 
thus targeting other terrorist groups would be contrary to their goals and objectives. 
Meanwhile, I would expect religious groups to attack other groups because they view their 
message as divine and worthy, while other messages pose a threat; it is essential for their 
message to reign supreme so threats need to be eliminated. Unsurprisingly, the results of this 
study indicate that left wing groups do not attack rivals, while religious groups do.  
 
Study 3: Religion and Politics: Examining the Impact of Faith on Political Participation 
(Co-authored with Prof. Omelicheva) 
 
This study seeks to examine how religion influences political participation. Some scholars have 
argued that religion has had an undeniable impact on domestic and international political 
actions, while others doubt that religion has any influence. However, there has been little 
systematic cross-national examination of whether the effect of religion extends beyond 
terrorism or other forms of political violence. This study seeks to fill that gap in the literature. 
While many studies have considered this question, they have considered it only at the country-
level. This study looks at the individual level, and the national level data, by utilizing multi-level 
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modeling. This provides a richer picture of the role of religion on political participation.  
 
This study considers seven forms of political participation: (1) petitions, (2) boycott, (3) 
demonstrations, (4) strikes, and (5) occupy. These forms of participation provide a wide range 
of political actions, peaceful and violent, as well as low and high effort actions. 
We argue that religion plays a substantial role in mobilizing political participation: (1) 
dissatisfaction with religious discrimination and under-representation are great motivators for 
political participation (Vüllers and Wegenast. 2011), (2) when people have grievances related to 
their religion, religion can become a politicizing issue and may make followers pursue political 
action, and (3) religious groups or organizations can be powerful mobilizing networks that 
promote and encourage political participation (Wiktorowicz 2003). Unlike other movements, 
religious movements often get supported from the state and have the potential to outlast other 
group types accordingly; they are less affected by shifts in public opinion (Aminzade and Perry 
2001, 160). However, this is not to say that other factors are ignored. We examine a range of 
contributing factors including membership in non-religious group, marital status, and age.  
Furthermore, while religion may mobilize political participation, different religions have 
different views and will therefore be likely to encourage varying forms of political participation. 
One cannot generalize religion and its influences, considering how religions may vary. 
Therefore, this study will examine a number of religions to gain a greater understanding of the 
variation in influence, by religion.  
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In line with expectations, we find that there is diversity in participation across religions. For 
example, we find that unlike members of other religions, Buddhists are likely to use all forms of 
political participation considered in this study. Interestingly, people who express high levels of 
political interest are less likely to engage politically (the negative statistically significant 
relationship is found across all models). We also find that age is negatively associated with all 
forms of participation. However, before discussing any of the results, this study first introduces 
the questions surrounding the impact of religion, outlines a theoretical framework, introduces 
the data and methods, and finally discusses the results.  
The study uses an openly-accessible dataset, namely, the World Values Survey. The World 
Values Survey3 (WVS) provides data about 113 countries from 1981 to 2014. It is a compilation 












                                                             
3 World Values Survey, 1981-2014 Longitudinal Aggregate v.20150418. World Values Survey Association 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: JD Systems, Madrid, Spain 
9 
 
Study 1: Terrorist Group-Types and Tactic Choice 
The scholarship in political violence and terrorism has made tremendous strides in 
understanding terrorism, its driving forces and conditions that facilitate the preparation and 
perpetration of terrorist attacks. It has catalogued the types of terrorist groups and their 
tactics, but neglected to systematically examine the relationship between the two. This study 
seeks to fill this void by examining whether different types of transnational terrorist groups are 
more likely to employ different tactics to achieve their respective goals. Furthermore, noting 
the possibility of change in this relationship across time, it purports to investigate whether 
transnational terrorist groups’ choice of tactic has varied according to the “waves of terrorism” 
identified by Rapoport (2002). To do this, a dataset (1970-2013) was constructed using the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  
Religious, nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, and environmental groups are considered 
in this study. By categorizing terrorist actors into these respective categories, I can delve deeper 
into the actions of specific groups and examine whether tactic choice differs across types of 
terrorist organizations. These actors have different political goals, consequently it can be 
expected that different types of terrorist groups are likely to be different in the choice of their 
tactics. Essentially, this study argues that group ideology is the driving force for a terrorist 
group’s strategic decisions. Terrorist group ideologies offer an interpretation and response to 
the grievances that gave rise to the terrorist group. They inform the terrorist group’s outlook 
and specific political goals.  While Karl Marx hardly referred to the term ideology, he did write 
of a mechanism that incited actions by virtue of an intangible force, a thought process – a 
worldview (Hamza, 2016). Ideology is powerful because it is capable of shaping a unique 
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outlook of reality, and in that lies its great power. In isolation, however, Ideology cannot dictate 
operational decisions. Ideology informs decisions of the terrorist group, but whether or not the 
group implements them is mitigated by capability and the target audience. This paper argues 
that it is this process that shapes tactic choice by terrorist groups.  
Although this study suggests that ideology, capability, and target audiences are the factors 
considered for operational decisions, Rapoport (2002) suggests that tactics are a result of a 
cycle, or “wave” of terrorism. He theorizes that waves of terrorism determine operational 
decisions, like tactic or target choices. This study will also seek to examine whether there is any 
empirical support for these theorizations. 
Recognizing the multitude of ways in which scholars and practitioners defined terrorism, this 
study uses Enders and Sandler’s (2000) definition of terrorism as “the premeditated use or 
threat of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective 
through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims”. This definition 
is comprehensive as it includes the targeting of both combatants and non-combatants and also 
includes social, as well as political motives. Most notably, it encompasses two of the most 
common components in definitions of terrorism, the use of fear via violence or threat or 
violence, and a political aim (1988). For the purpose of this study, I examine only transnational 
terrorist incidents. Although most terrorism is domestic (Sanchez-Cuenca and De la Calle, 2009), 
it is a distinct forms of politically motivated violence that calls for models that are different 
from those employed in the analyses of transnational terrorism. (Enders and Sandler, 2000). 
Transnational terrorism speaks to a different motivation than domestic terrorism, the message 
or signal groups are intending to send are not localized to only one public, or one country. 
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Transnational terrorism, in this study, is guided by the definition provided by the GTD. The GTD 
present a number of criteria to declare an incident as international, and if it possesses any of 
these characteristics, it is classified as international (GTD Codebook, 2014). Firstly, if any of the 
victims are of another nationality than the country attacked, secondly, if any of the 
perpetrators are of a different nationality than the location of the incident, and thirdly, if the 
group responsible organized the incident from a country other than the country attacked (GTD 
Codebook, 2014). 
This study contends, and finds, that there are important distinctions in terrorist groups’ 
behavior based on their ideology and that it is imperative we reintroduce this ideological 
context to studies of terrorism. The new dataset used in this study allows scholars to parse out 
differences among groups. This study provides evidence suggesting that group-types vary in 
their choice of tactic, and this carries with it implications for targeted counter-terrorism 
policies.  
This study will first review the theoretical literature pertaining to the division of groups into 
group-types, the role of ideology, and the significance of tactic choice. Within this review, a 
number of hypotheses concerning tactic selection by the various group-types will be put forth. 
A series of maximum likelihood models and post-estimation graphs will test the assertions 
made in this study. Finally, this study will discuss the implications of the results as well as the 
study’s limitations. 
Categorization of terrorism group-types  
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This study examines nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, religious and environmental 
groups, but other scholars have offered narrower or more expansive typologies. I will first 
outline the categorization utilized in this study, and then I will examine how other scholars have 
categorized groups.  
Nationalist/separatist groups are groups that seek to overtake the system of government 
currently in place, or they are groups which seek the autonomy to form an independent nation 
of their own. For example, the Free Papua Movement (OPM), which was established in 1963, 
pursued the goal of Papuan autonomy from Indonesia. The group attacked Indonesian military 
targets and took hostages to further their goal of desired autonomy. Left wing groups are 
defined as groups with left-leaning and revolutionary ideologies; these groups generally 
support a socialist or communist ideology, and they may seek to undermine the unequal 
distribution of wealth in a given nation. For example, the Shining Path is classified as a left wing 
group. The group sought to overthrow the Peruvian government by means of violence to 
establish a new form of government that represented the working class people. The Shining 
Path used a plethora of tactics, including bombing, armed assault and assassinations. Right wing 
groups defy left wing concepts like communism and socialism, and lean toward fascist, and at 
times, racist ideology. An example of a group in this category is the Vietnamese Party to 
Exterminate the Communists and Restore the Nation. This group was founded upon the belief 
that communism in Vietnam needed to be disavowed. This group assassinated a member of the 
Vietnamese government, and also perpetrated other attacks in support of their anti-communist 
message. Religious groups are groups claiming to be guided in their actions by their given 
religion, for example Daesh as led by Islamic extremism or the Jewish Defense Organization as 
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led by Jewish extremism. Environmental groups are defined as groups who are guided by their 
missions to end perceived animal cruelty or ecological destruction. For example, the Animal 
Rights Militia (ARM) is an animal rights group that seeks to improve the conditions of animals, 
including seeking an end to animal testing. The group committed numerous bombings, but they 
have not killed a single individual. 
Groups may espouse more than one ideology, and, therefore, can been classified in more than 
one type. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example, has held both nationalist/separatist and 
religious goal and, therefore, is an illustration of the mixed group type. The IRA seeks an 
independent and unified Ireland, but is also guided by Catholicism. Groups like the IRA  are 
coded more than once in all of the respective categories. There were no groups in the dataset 
that were classified into more than two group types based on their ideology.  
This categorization was selected because ideology is the focus of this study, specifically with 
regards to tactic selection. However, like the other classifications put forth, there are flaws with 
this categorization. It does not consider sub-groups of groups; while this study considers right 
wing groups, it does not grant right wing subgroups of “racist” or “anti-communist” oriented 
groups. The categorization selected was broad intentionally, in order to provide a general frame 
of understanding of the variation among groups.  
Other scholars conceptualize group-types in a variety of ways. Vasilenko (2005) classifies 
terrorist organizations into five types: (1) political, (2) separatist, (3) nationalist, (4) nationalist, 
(5) religious, and (5) criminal. Although no typology can hope to perfectly categorize groups, 
Vasilenko’s exclusion of environmental groups is notable. Environmental groups are less 
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numerous than other group types, but they do perpetrate devastating attacks, and to ignore 
those would be willful exclusion of a group type that has been active in the past, and continues 
to be active currently. For example, this study examines over a thousand groups, and even 
though 15 of those are environmental, they are responsible for 479 incidents. Further, 
Vasilenko separate nationalist and separatist group, while this study categorize them together. 
Vasilenko (2005) asserts that the difference in aims is enough to separate the categories, but 
Kaplan (2010) offers a counter argument that nationalist movements are generally associated 
with separatist or autonomous claims, and it is therefore logical to group them together. For 
example, as previously noted the OPM sought an independent Papuan state, but this was 
rooted in the national tides of the Papuan people who feared that their culture and traditions 
were being threatened by wider Indonesia. This group illustrates that national tendencies often 
have separatist goals.  
Cindy Combs (2000) suggests that we should break down groups into types based on their tactic 
choice, target choice, and group organizers. This leads to a more unique set of group categories, 
including sanctioned terror, which involves the leadership of state political officials, targeting 
the population and using organized repression as a tactic (Combs, 2000). Other typologies of 
terrorism classified under Combs’ requirements are mass terror, dynastic murder, random 
terror, focused random terror and revolutionary tactical terror (Combs, 2000). Combs’ typology 
is not solely based on goals or ideology, and that adds yet another layer of context in 
understanding terrorism. However, categorizing groups in this manner is not always possible 
given information limitations and it does not allow scholars an opportunity to examine the 
relationship between tactic choice and ideology.  
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Boaz Ganor (2008) also takes a unique stance on classifying terrorist group types; instead of 
using ideology, he suggests a model that gauges terrorist motivation and organizational 
capability to conduct attacks to classify groups. He operates under the assumption that 
terrorism = motivation + operational capability. He suggests that these two factors, given a 
terror threshold period (which accounts for a period in time where an attack is more likely) can 
predict terrorist attacks. According to Ganor (2008), these are the variables that limit the 
activities and operations of terrorist groups and they are therefore the best factors to 
categorize groups. Ganor (2008) lists his 5 groups A-E: group A has the motivation, in a given a 
period of time, but does not have the capability so they are unlikely to perpetrate an attack, but 
group B has motivation and capability so they are “above the terror threshold” and are likely to 
attack (since there is a citation in quotation marks, provide a page number for the quote). 
Group C has the motivation and operational capability, but their motivation is lower than their 
capability (Ganor, 2008). Group D has the operational capability, but not the needed 
motivation, and finally Group E has neither the capability nor motivation in the terror threshold 
period (Ganor, 2008). This is an interesting way to place groups into types. it is highly focused 
on counter terrorism and preparation, but this is only useful if information is available and 
accurate.    
Wilkinson (1976) has yet another variation of terrorist group types. He lists four types of 
groups, (1) criminal, (2) psychic, (3) war, and (4) political. He defines criminal groups as those 
who use terror as a means to material wealth. Psychic groups are led by extreme, fanatical 
religious beliefs. War groups are described as groups who will attack without abandon to defeat 
an enemy, and political groups are described as groups who will use systematic violence to 
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achieve their political goals (Wilkinson, 1976; Poland, 1988). Wilkinson’s (1976) typology is not 
limited by this initial classification. He also lists sub-group characteristics. For instance, political 
groups are further divided into three sub-types: (1) revolutionary, (2) sub-revolutionary4, and 
repressive (Wilkinson, 1976). This typology system that Wilkinson created pays great attention 
to detail, and conveys the complexity of categorizing terrorist groups. However, because it has 
so many components and layers, it requires a great deal of information about groups - 
information that is generally inaccessible.   
How and why does ideology matter? 
Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find that terrorist lethality is associated with ideology and 
organizational size. Ideology guides the goals of an organization, and in order to fulfill those 
goals, groups will be strategic in their choice of tactic. A nationalist/separatist group will be 
greatly concerned about public perception given their appeal for autonomy, but a religious 
group who has motives that extend beyond a nation’s borders may use less discriminate tactics.  
At the root of this argument is the need for context and the admission that terrorist groups are 
far more complex than initially theorized (Master, 2008). The inclusion of more detail, such as 
terrorist ideology, adds another piece to the puzzle and furthers our understanding of terrorist 
actions. Master (2008) finds that terrorist groups behave differently with regards to the number 
of acceptable casualties. This suggests, like Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) find, that ideology 
plays a role in behavior. In essence, Master (2008) argues that terrorists think rationally about 
their attacks, and will only perpetrate attacks with acceptable casualty numbers. This is not to 
                                                             
4 Defined as terrorism that is used for “political motives other than revolution or government repression”  
17 
 
say that terrorism is appropriate or acceptable, but rather that the perpetrators view it is a 
logical, rational course of action given their grievances, resources, and their goals. Post (2005) 
also suggests that ideology is a driving force for terrorist groups, and that categorizing them 
into types is key to understanding their behavior. Post (2005) divides groups into social 
revolutionaries, nationalist/separatists, and religious fundamentalists, and he explains that 
these groups are inherently different from one another, because although they may all resort 
to violence, their motivations, their goals, and their structures vary. Terrorist groups may be 
united in their willingness to threaten or commit violence, but their motivations vary, so it 
would be an oversimplification to classify them as a unified bloc.  
When considering the role of ideology in informing non-violent political participation, it may be 
constructed with the input of the broader public via voting or demonstrations (Bawn, 1999). In 
many circumstances, especially in democracies, there are outlets for participation, whereby 
members of the public may pursue the realization of their worldviews within their political 
system. Bawn (1999) suggests that ideology is a “construction of ‘us’”; it is a culmination of 
values and beliefs and leads to formulation of a group identity. Although this form of identity is 
formed with the direct input of the public, one could also suggest that violent participation, 
namely terrorism, is formed with indirect input of a target audience. Terrorist groups 
understand that they need the support for their cause, so they incorporate their grievances 
with those of the target audience. Their target audience being the individuals and communities 
they hope to inspire, recruit, and continue to receive financial support from. This leads to the 
creation of an identity, or of an “us” as Bawn (1999) puts forward. I argue that groups create 
these identities by establishing their ideology and showing their audience that they are a 
18 
 
collective, or an “us”, and that they are fighting on their behalf. Bawn (1999) also argues that 
ideology allows for a greater platform, since an ideology formulates individuals’ worldview. It 
also informs their decisions on matters that do not directly affect them, “Ideology is an 
enduring system of beliefs, prescribing what action to take in a variety of political 
circumstances. For example, if an abortion clinic opens in my neighborhood, my ideology tells 
me whether I should (a) picket the entrance, (b) write a check to support the clinic, or (c) do 
nothing” (Bawn, 1999 pages for the quote!).  This may also be applied to terrorist groups. 
Consider once again, the example of the OPM. The OPM’s objective was an independent, 
autonomous state for the Papuan people. Even though they wanted secession, they were also 
very concerned with non-ethnic Papuans migrating to their areas. Supporters may have joined 
the cause of the OPM because of secession, but their support also informs their opinion of 
migration – as a threat. Now, a group which has one main goal, to secede, has also informed 
them of their view on immigration, as ideology informs people of their reaction to abortion. 
Ideology is expansive, and highly influential which is why this study argues the ideology is the 
root driver of tactic choice.  
As Figure 1 shows, this study posits that ideology is the main driver of terrorist group choices, 
but those choices are mitigated by capability. Capability is representative of resources that 
groups possess; this is not limited to finances - it also includes skillsets (i.e. bomb-makers) and 
the continued support of target audiences. For example, the Afrkianer Weerstandsbewegig5 
(AWB) is a right wing group based in South Africa since 1973. The pro-apartheid group aims to 
                                                             
5 Translates to Afrikaner Resistance Movement 
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disrupt political stability within South Africa. The group has a large base and target audience; 
the fall of apartheid did not change the entire nation’s mindset. The group’s supporters largely 
include white South Africans who believe in a divided society based on race and who believe 
that apartheid was the appropriate system for South Africa (TRAC, 2015). The AWB has many 
resources, but it has failed to establish legal or political legitimacy. The group largely uses 
assassinations and kidnappings as a means of political disruption. This group, although a single 
example, is illustrative of how ideology may be the motivation for tactic choice. Furthermore, it 
is illustrative of how actions are taken according to the target audience, and in accordance with 
the capability of the group – as kidnappings and assassinations require both resources, 
secondary locations, and skills. In essence, ideology drives tactic choice, but that decision is 
mitigated by capability and target audience.  
Figure 1: Theorization of terrorist group choices 
 
There are scholars who have addressed the importance of tactic choice, even if they do not 
specifically discuss the role of terrorist group types. Hoffman and McCormick (2004) suggest 
that terrorism is strategic signaling, and tactic choice frames a given signal. They find that 
suicide bombing, relative to other attack types, is an instrumental choice of tactic; it is not an 
expression of desperation but rather a calculated decision to signal their target audience 
(Hoffman and McCormick, 2004). Bloom (2004) also suggests that suicide bombing is a strategic 
choice, and it is a tactic choice made in a battle to outbid other terrorist groups. Although this 
study does not distinguish among bombing and suicide bombing, largely due to data limitations, 
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previous studies indicate that tactic choice matters, and it is based on a group’s objectives and 
resources.  
Given lack of available data, one cannot have a perfect indicator or measure of a group’s 
resources, but there are other means of estimating resources, namely, time of survival. A 
group’s age, for example, is one indicator that may shed light on the amount of resources at a 
group’s discretion. Even though exact age is often difficult to discern given the clandestine 
nature of terrorist groups, one can usually ascertain whether groups survive past the one-year 
mark, an important milestone given that Cronin (2006) and Rapoport (2002) find that 90% of 
groups do not survive past one year. This study also includes a variable to examine whether 
groups surpass five years.  
H1: Tactic choice will vary across ideological group-types 
 H1a: Capability, with group age as a proxy, will be a significant predictor of tactic choice 
 
Are there “waves of terrorism”?   
Rapoport (2002) suggests that there are four distinct waves of terrorism6: (1) the anarchist 
wave in the 1880s, (2) the anti-colonial wave in the 1920s, (3) the new left wave of the 1960s, 
and (4) the religious wave beginning in 1979 and lasting till today. Rapoport (2002) puts forth 
that the first three waves lasted approximately 40 years, and that we may expect this current 
wave to also last that same amount of time. Not only does Rapoport (2002) suggest that there 
                                                             
6 Although Kaplan (2010) disagrees, and suggests that we are currently experiencing the fifth wave, which is 
representative of a more extremist, xenophobic, and tribal version of terrorism  
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are four waves, but also that they are distinguished by the tactics used within each wave; he 
suggests that the first wave was riddles by bank robberies and assassinations, the second wave 
was also characterized by assassinations, the third wave consisted of hijacking, hostage taking, 
and kidnapping, while the fourth wave is characterized by bombings, hostage taking and 
assassinations. Although Rapoport (2002) does not test these assumptions, he makes a 
compelling argument using historical narratives. Given the limited timespan of the data used in 
this study, only the presence of the last two waves may be examined.  
Although there are scholars, like Rapoport, who suggest that this new wave is potentially upon 
us, there hasn’t been a systematic study to support the argument (Crenshaw, 2000). Rapaport’s 
choice of date for the fourth wave is oddly specific, he declares its beginnings in 1979. His 
definition of the other periods are much more vague. The choice of date is particularly 
interesting; he sets it because of Muslim based events only, even though religious terrorism 
does not only consist of Islamic terrorist groups. Rapoport (2002) selects this date because it 
was the year of the Islamic revolution in Iran, when Muslim fighters forced the Soviets out of 
Afghanistan, and it was the beginning of a new Muslim century according to the Islamic 
calendar. All of these events center solely on Muslim events; perhaps it is short sighted to 
consider only Muslim events. Rapoport does say that Islam is the most important religion in the 
fourth wave, but should Muslim events be the only determinant for the date of the wave? 
Blomberg et al (2011) do however find that groups who are motivated by religious goals, as 
opposed to more political goals, are more likely to survive the test of time.  
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Nonetheless, Rapoport makes a compelling argument. The historical analysis and description of 
the trends in terrorism tactics and ideological prevalence are theoretically sound, and this study 
offers one an opportunity to examine whether Rapoport’s theories have any empirical basis.   
H2: The third wave of terrorism will be associated with hijacking and kidnapping 
H3: The fourth wave of terrorism will be associated with bombings, kidnapping, and 
assassinations 
The role of the Internet 
Terrorist organizations are inherently rational as they seek to fulfill specific objectives or goals 
by the use or threat of use of violence. However, this effect is mitigated by other factors, 
including the improvement of technology and the emergence of competition. The evolution in 
technology has allowed data sharing to become instantaneous, and that has consequently 
affected how terrorists behave. Many groups, like Daesh, have a proclivity to using twitter to 
inform their supporters, sympathizers, and their enemy about their acts and intentions. Not 
only does the expansion of the internet and technology allow for immediate sharing, it also 
allows terrorists to communicate and be closer to their potential recruitment pool. Technology 
has radically altered our ability to access information about groups that could previously be 
ignored in the limited news cycle of media outlets. Furthermore, the emergence of twenty-
four-hour news cycles has also given terrorist groups greater opportunity to garner attention, 
but now, they have serious competition. The internet has not only given terrorist groups access 
to a wider audience and potential recruits, but it has also given them, and other groups, the 
ability to counter the previously dominant state narrative, “terrorism as theater” (Weimann, 
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2006). Operations are “orchestrated” to suit the goals and objectives of the group, including 
their fight for coverage and attention (Weimann, 2006). Given this appeal of terrorist theater, 
one could expect that the internet has encouraged less discriminate tactics, such as bombings 
and armed assaults. Tactics themselves communicate a message to a target audience, and the 
internet facilitates the distribution of that message. 
H4: The rise of the internet will be associated with increases in less discriminate tactics, namely 
bombings and armed assaults.  
Understanding tactic choice allows us to examine the actions and choices of various group-
types. It also allows us to examine whether ideologies matter, or whether terrorist groups 
pursue the same tactics. A group is sending a very different message by bombing a public place, 
or by kidnapping a leader. The tactics are additional indications of the groups’ intentions and 
how far they are willing to go to achieve their goals. However, the goals of terrorist groups are 
mitigated by their resources and capabilities. Cronin (2006) finds that 90% of terrorist groups 
do not survive past 1 year. It takes resources and skill to maintain and fund a terrorist 
organization so we can expect that group viability is a critical factor in predicting tactic choice. 
Groups cannot orchestrate a kidnapping, for example, if they do not have a secure secondary 
location or the ability to negotiate a ransom. It would be a mistake to treat terrorist groups as if 
they were a uniform block. This addition of context is imperative to furthering our 
understanding of terrorism.  
Data and Methods 
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This study utilizes a new dataset that was compiled from the edited data contained in the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD is a publicly available dataset that collects 
information about terrorist incidents. Based within The University of Maryland’s National 
Consortium for the study of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism (also known as START), the GTD is 
an enormous effort that employs a plethora of scholars and researchers to help improve our 
understanding of terrorism (GTD, n.d). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initially 
funded the GTD with a $12 million grant, and has since continued to fund the center to further 
research in the field of terrorism (GTD, n.d). The GTD’s contributions are great, and given the 
growing usage of the dataset, it is especially important to improve the quality of its content.  
The GTD records information about thousands of terrorism incidents (1970-2013), and it is 
therefore susceptible to error. I began to go through the transnational dataset, line by line, and 
noticed a plethora of irregularities. There were ‘terrorist’ groups included that were actually 
organized crime syndicates, not terrorist groups. For example, the 14 K Triad is listed as a 
transnational terrorist organization when it is an organized crime group. The triad is responsible 
for illegal gambling, drug trafficking, and human trafficking; the organization’s key goal is 
financial benefit, not a political agenda. Accordingly, I would put forth that this group does not 
qualify as a terrorist group. There were various spellings of the same group listed, so that the 
group was listed twice instead of once. There were even ethnicities and nationalities listed, like 
“Arabs” or “Egyptians”, instead of terrorist groups. The latter is not only inaccurate, but 
unprofessional and insensitive7. Therefore, I began the process of “cleaning” the data. While 
                                                             
7 I did contact the GTD to inform them of these errors, but I received no response  
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the mistakes in the dataset are problematic, it does not render the dataset useless. Many of the 
groups were consequently dropped. While it is understandable that the coders were trying to 
place an identifying marker, i.e. “Egyptian” perpetrators, their coding scheme would instead 
suggest that coders mark the perpetrator as “unknown”. By far, “unknown” perpetrators 
commit the greatest number of terrorist incidents in the dataset. This fact, does, inevitably 
affect any findings because it suggests to us that while we may have a large amount of “clean” 
data, we are still missing information about many more terrorist incidents, so I have to be 
careful when interpreting any findings resulting from this dataset. Before editing, 1335 groups 
were identified, but after the data was cleaned, 1053 groups remained.  
After the data was cleaned, the groups needed to be identified and categorized into their 
respective group-type. This was done with the guidance of the Terrorist Research Analysis and 
Consortium (TRAC)8 and Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs)9. TRAC and TOPs are databases 
containing information about a plethora of terrorist organizations. They provide a brief history 
and biography of each group while also indicating their ideological beliefs. At times, this is more 
complex because groups evolve and include additional goals to their agenda - thereby shifting 
their ideology. In these cases, I consulted the entire history of a group for its categorization, 
unless the evolution consisted of a split. For example, if a religious group changed its agenda to 
also include a goal of securing an autonomous region, then it has shifted from just religious to 
both religious and nationalist/separatist. However, if the group splintered, and the original 
group maintained its religious category, then it was assigned as religious. The splinter group 
                                                             
8 TRAC. 2015. Retrieved from www.trackingterrorism.org 
9 TOPs. 2015. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database 
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was categorized as religious and nationalist/separatist. These shifts were not always accounted 
for in the histories provided in TOPs and TRAC, and therefore there will be some evolving 
categorizations that have been missed and that needs to be considered in the finding stages of 
the studies included in this dissertation.  
Evolution is not the only complication however. Some groups have multiple political agendas 
and therefore fit into multiple categories. I coded groups in every category that they fit into. For 
example, the Basque Separatist group, ETA, is categorized as both left wing and 
nationalist/separatist, since their agenda and goals fit both criteria. Unlike other groups such as 
the Colombian Black Hand, which is only categorized as right wing. This is a coding decision 
based on previous literature, but I also consider it is the most appropriate course of action 
because it more accurately reflects the groups’ agendas (Asal and Rethmeyer, 2008).  
To code the group types, I created five dummy variables coded “1” if the group was defined as 
belonging to right wing (left-wing, etc.)  ideology, and “0” if otherwise. Consequently, there 
were five separate dummy variables. Groups with one ideology, say left wing, would be 
assigned a value of “1” in the left wing variable. Groups who had more than two ideologies, 
were coded within both categories, for example the ETA would have a value of “1” in the left 
wing variable, and another “1” in the nationalist/separatist variables. I also created two 
variables to code mixed ideologies, given a value of 1 if they met both group-type criteria, and 0 
if they did not: Nationalist/Separatist and Religious and Nationalist/Separatist and Left Wing. 
These two groups are the only balanced groups available that may be tested without biasing 
the estimates (Johnson, 2010). Mixed groups need to share at least 10% of observations, 
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otherwise they bias the estimates within the model (Johnson, 2010). Only two mixed groups 
meet that requirement, and are therefore included.  
Table 1: Number of groups in the dataset         Table 2: Number of observations in the dataset 
  Number of Groups      
Number of 
Observations 
NS 368   NS 10193 
LW 309   LW 7195 
RW 84   RW 1222 
Religious 276   Religious 5650 
Environmen
t 15   
Environmen
t 479 
NS/LW 35   NS/LW 3057 
NS/Religious 80   NS/Religious 2265 
          
Total 116710   Total 30061 
 
Dependent variables 
There are six tactics that are being examined in this study. These include bombings, armed 
assaults, hijacking, barricading, assassinations, and kidnappings. Bombing is defined as the use 
of an explosive device to cause harm or destroy property for political ends (GTD, 2015). Armed 
assaults are described as the intent to injure or kill politically rich targets with the use of 
incendiary devices, firearms, or knives (GTD, 2015). Hijacking is defined as gaining control of a 
vehicle (plane, car, bus etc.) and rerouting the given vehicle’s course for political ends (GTD, 
2015). Barricading is akin to kidnapping, but the targets are kept in the same location as 
opposed to kidnappers who take their targets to secondary locations (GTD, 2015). Assassination 
is defined as aiming to kill a high value target for political purposes (GTD, 2015). Kidnapping is 
                                                             
10 Please note that this number is reflective of how many groups are coded within each category, so this is inclusive 
of some groups that are coded in two categories.  
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defined as the taking of hostages for political ends (GTD, 2015). The variables are coded 0 if the 
tactic was not used, and 1 if the given tactic was used. 
Independent variables 
The models include six group types, including two mixed group-types: left wing, right wing, 
religious, environmental, nationalist/separatist and religious, and nationalist/separatist and left 
wing, with nationalist/separatist groups as the reference category. All of these variables are 
dummies: they are coded 1 if they are in that given group, and 0 if they are not. Furthermore, 
there are two variables that represent capability and survivability of groups. There is a variable 
that represents survival of one year, 1 if they do survive their first year, 0 if they do not. A 
variable indicating survival past 5 years is also included, 1 if they survive 5 or more years, 0 if 
they do not.  
Controlling for time 
The models also account for time. There are three specific time-based dummy variables. The 
third wave variable accounts for the years 1970-1995, as indicated by Rapoport, and the fourth 
wave variable accounts for the year after 1978, also indicated by Rapoport. The internet age is 
accounted for by including a variable that examines the years after 1995. Also, a general time 
variable is included denoting the years to control for time for the entire 1970-2013 period. 
Post-estimation will then be conducted on each model, and these findings will be graphically 




Given the binary dependent variables, maximum likelihood models are used. In Table 3, six 
models are represented, each model pertaining to a tactic type.. These time series, cross 
sectional models all utilize logistic regression. Post-estimation will then be conducted on each 







models  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
 Bombing 
Armed 
Assault Hijack Barricade Assassinate Kidnap 
Left wing 0.963 1.044 0.426 9.003** 0.162** 3.472** 
  0.046 0.08 0.197 2.229 0.017 0.221 
Right wing 0.446*** 0.527**  0.036** 8.25** 0.856 
  0.038 0.092  0.037 0.717 0.1 
Religious 1.694*** 0.765** 2.075** 0.352* 2.166** 0.630** 
  0.087 0.054 0.759 0.166 0.245 0.052 
Environmental 0.144**  0.752  0.042** 0.021** 
  0.028  0.796  0.021 0.021 
NS/Religious 1.833** 1.297** 1.368 0.851 1.116 0.701** 
  0.103 0.094 0.584 0.479 0.107 0.064 
NS/Left wing 2.041** 0.641** 0.583 1.43 1.971** 0.444** 
  0.106 0.058 0.265 0.484 0.14 0.046 
One year 1.894** 5.402** 0.85 0.025** 0.068** 0.876 
  0.131 0.92 0.549 0.008 0.012 0.083 
Five years 0.460** 1.095 1.323 1.538 6.302** 1.356** 
  0.025 0.092 0.71 0.454 1.111 0.108 
Third wave 1.933** 0.752* 0.985 1400059 1.127 2.143* 
  0.155 0.077 0.611 9.33E+08 0.122 0.522 
Fourth wave 2.310** 0.251** 1.886 81.479** 0.804* 0.418** 
  0.138 0.026 0.931 25.976 0.071 0.037 
Internet age 2.701** 0.467** 1.629 1689321 0.143** 14.21** 
  0.224 0.051 1.012 1.13E+09 0.018 3.439 
Year 0.967** 1.095** 0.949 9.04E-01 1.004 0.967** 
  0.004 0.006 0.027 0.02 0.006 0.005 
Constant 1.05e+28** 
1.62e-
79** 4.16E+42 5.23e+77** 0.00009 5.34e+27** 
  7.65E+28 1.78E-78 2.4E+44 3.49E+80 0.001 5.93E+28 
        
N 18413 17990 17448 17990 18413 18413 
LR chi2 1406.71 1554.98 16.26 1232.09 3365.72 2028.47 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0.1317 0 0 0 
R2 0.0556 0.1092 0.0198 0.433 0.2191 0.1393 
        
** P value < .001; * P value < .05 
Results in odd ratios; Nationalist/Separatists is the reference category for group-types; Standard errors 
are included below coefficients in italics; Empty cells are an indication of perfect prediction of failure 




The results presented in Table 3 support my hypothesis that there is some variation in terrorist 
groups’ tactics based on their ideology.  The models sample sizes are very large, with an N of 
approximately 20,000 in each model. Keeping in mind that the larger the N, the higher the 
chances of significance, the models produce some very interesting results.  
For instance, in Model 1, one can observe that religious groups are more likely to use bombing, 
relative to nationalist/separatist groups, but right wing groups are less likely to use bombing, 
relative to nationalist/separatist groups, ceteris paribus. This variation is an indication that 
treating groups as uniform entities ignores the diversity among groups. Most of the findings are 
in line with expectations. For example, right wing groups are generally more targeted in their 
goals, and use more discriminate tactics to gain political favor for their agendas which is why it 
is not surprising that they are less likely to use bombing. It is also unsurprising that right wing 
groups are more likely to use assassination, as indicated by Model 5. Relative to 
nationalist/separatist groups, right wing groups have 8.25 higher odds ratio of using 
assassination as a tactic, ceteris paribus.  As stated earlier, right wing groups seek to destabilize 
the political arena within a given state, and assassinations may cause chaos and panic; the large 
coefficient is further indication of this.  
However, some of the findings are not in line with expectations. Left wing groups, as previously 
described, are revolutionary in nature and seek to institute a new government regime, and 
therefore I would expect them to use less discriminate tactics such as bombing. Bombings 
evoke large reactions and garner a great deal of attention, thus granting groups a large 
platform, which they may use to promote their agendas. Unexpectedly, the left wing variable is 
32 
 
insignificant in the bombing model. This is possibly due to model being relative to 
nationalist/separatist groups, but there is an alternative explanation. In the other models, left 
wing groups do have higher odds ratios for barricading and kidnapping, suggesting that they 
use high profile tactics, but discriminate ones. This contradicts my expectation, but it does still 
convey a need to garner attention. Conceivably, less discriminate tactics may negatively impact 
the target audience when a key objective of the group is to replace the current regime.  
I also predicted that capability, measured by group age, would be significant across all models. 
This is not the case, but the five-year variable is insignificant for the armed assault, hijacking, 
and barricade models, possibly suggesting that these tactics are not frequently used by older 
groups. However, one must remember that although a variable is insignificant, it does not 
mean that the value of the variable is actually equivalent to zero. The group age variables do 
present interesting results. For example, Model 6 shows a large, positive, and significant 
coefficient for the five-year survival variable. Relative to groups who do not survive past five 
years, those who do have a 1.356 higher odds ratio of using kidnapping as a tactic, ceteris 
paribus. This suggests that older groups are more likely to commit kidnappings, which is logical, 
because they are a form of revenue. Survival is dependent on resources, and older groups need 
to maintain a flow of resources. Kidnapping brings revenue, and they continue to vie for 
survival. Moreover, relative to groups who do not survive past one year, groups that do survive 
past the one-year mark have a 1.894 higher odds ratio of using bombing, ceteris paribus. 
Relative to groups who do not survive past one year, groups who do survive have a 5.042 higher 
odds ratio of using armed assault, ceteris paribus. The latter two results indicate that groups 
who survive one or more years use less discriminate tactics. This is expected, as groups need to 
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continue to vie for attention, and these tactics result in large-scale attacks. This further conveys 
that group factors mitigate tactic choice.  
Moreover, there are four empty cells in the table, namely in Models 2, 3 and 4. This is an 
indication of perfect prediction of failure, meaning, for example, that environmental groups did 
not perpetrate any armed assaults or use barricading as a tactic in this data as indicated by 
Model 4. Consequently, there are no coefficients or standard errors produced in the models. 
However, this is not to say that we cannot learn from these empty cells. This perfect prediction 
of failure is informative about environmental group behavior, for example. Environmental 
groups generally avoid any collateral damage, so it would be contradictory for the groups to use 
tactics such as armed assaults.  
Although the findings do not all fall within expectations, ideology does prove to be a useful 
predictor of tactic choice.  
In order to better evaluate the findings of the models, the predicted probabilities were 














                                                             
11NS: Nationalist/Separatist; LW: Left wing; RW; Right wing; R: Religious; E: Environmental; NSR: Nationalist 
separatist and religious; NSLW: Nationalist separatist and left wing. As can be observed, not all group-types are 
significant in Table 1, but they are all represented in the graphs above except in the case of perfect prediction of 
failure. Even when coefficients are insignificant, we cannot assume that they are equal to zero. This is why they are 























































































Graph D: Predictive Margins of Group-Type with 95% CIs
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Graph F: Predictive Margins of Group-Type with 95% CIs
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The collection of graphs above provides a visualization of the differences among groups. Graph 
A, which conveys the predicted probability of using bombings as a tactic, by group-type shows 
that groups differ in their use of bombing. The graph shows that the confidence intervals do not 
overlap, with the exception of the overlap between religious and nationalist/separatist groups. 
Graph A also suggests that environmental groups are the least likely to use bombings as a 
tactic.  
Graph B conveys the predicted probability of using armed assault as a tactic, by group-type. 
This graph also shows a diversity in the likelihood of using armed assaults, but some of the 
confidence intervals overlap, suggesting that not all variation is significant. However, it does 
suggest that the mixed group-type of nationalist/separatist and religious is the most likely 
group-type to use armed assault. Religious and right wing group-types have overlapping 
confidence intervals suggesting that I cannot distinguish among them when it comes to the 
likelihood of using armed assault. 
Graph C indicates the predicted probability of using hijacking as a means of attack, by group-
type. All of the groups’ confidence intervals overlap with at least one other group, suggesting 
that there is an inability to distinguish likelihood of using hijacking, by group. For example, 
while religious groups are most likely to use hijacking as a tactic, the confidence intervals 
overlap with environmental and nationalist/separatist and religious (NS/R) groups. However, 




Graph D conveys the predicted probability of using barricading as a tactic, by group type. 
Similar to Graph C, there is overlap among the confidence intervals. I can observe, for example, 
that left wing groups have the highest predicted probability of using barricading, but that 
overlaps with the confidence intervals of the NS/R groups and their probability of using 
barricading also decreases over time. 
Graph E conveys the predicted probability of using assassination, by group type. There is some 
overlap in this graph, but as can be observed, right wing groups have the highest predicted 
probability of using assassination as a tactic, as previously indicated by Table 3.  
Graph F indicates the predicted probability of using kidnapping as a tactic, by group type. The 
graph shows that there is a distinguishable difference in the probability of using kidnapping for 
left wing and environmental groups. Left wing groups have the highest predicted probability, 
0.22, of using kidnapping as tactic. Environmental groups have the lowest predicted probability, 
with confidence intervals going below zero in some years.   
To further understand if there is any evidence in support of the “waves of terrorism”, post-
estimation graphs were created.  










Rapoport (2002) puts forth that the third wave, also known as the leftist wave, is associated 
with hijacking and kidnapping.  As can be noted from Graph G, there is a very slight downward 
use of hijacking during the period of the third wave. This suggests that while this tactic was 
utilized during the timeframe of the wave, it did not increase in the period. This does not 
dispute Rapoport’s finding that hijacking was used in this period, but it does suggest that the 
probability of hijacking was not increasingly over time. It suggests that the predicted probability 
goes from approximately 0.0035 to 0.0033 during the third wave.  
Graph H indicates support for Rapoport’s theorization of the use of kidnappings during the third 
wave, but unlike hijacking, the predicted probability of using kidnapping as a tactic increases 
during the wave; going from approximately 0.09 to 0.17. The graph indicates that there is a 
clear increase in the probability of using kidnapping in this time frame.  
Further post-estimation was conducted to address H3, which predicted that the fourth wave, 
















































Graph H: Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
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Post-estimation Graph Collection 3: Predicted probability of bombing, kidnapping, and 





   
 
 
As indicated by Graph I, there is clear evidence to suggest that the probability of bombings 
increased during the fourth wave. The predicted probability of bombing in the fourth wave goes 
from approximately 0.3 to 0.49. This further bolsters Rapoport’s theorization and provides 






























































Graph K: Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
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Graph J suggests that there is a decreased predicted probability in the use of kidnappings in the 
fourth wave. This does not suggest that this tactic was not used in this period, but it does 
suggest that the predicted probability of the use of this tactic is lower during the fourth wave.  
There is a decreased predicted probability of the use of assassinations as a tactic within the 
fourth wave, illustrated by Graph K. Again, this is not an indication that this tactic was not used, 
but that it was on the decline during the period.  
The graphs indicate that only bombings showed a higher predicted probability of being used 
over the course of the fourth wave.  
Finally, to address the fourth hypothesis, post-estimation was conducted to convey the role of 
the internet on tactic selection. H4 expected that the internet age would be associated with 
less discriminate tactics, specifically bombings and armed assaults, as they would garner 
greater attention.  





















































Graph M: Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
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As expected, the predicted probability of the use of bombings increased with the rise of the 
internet. Less discriminate tactic use garners greater attention, and it is unsurprising that 
groups would use this method because they can gain a greater audience. H4 indicated that the 
internet age would specifically be associated with bombings and armed assaults, and the graphs 
indicate that while the predicted probability of bombing increases after the emergence of the 
internet, the predicted probability of armed assaults decreases. This is perhaps the result of a 
proclivity to use bombings over armed assaults because they can cause more harm and 
potentially garner more attention. Model 6 also indicates that the internet age is positively 
associated with kidnapping. This is of particular interest, because while I did not conceptualize 
this tactic as associated with the rise of the internet, kidnapping is a high-profile tactic that 
could use the internet medium to reach the target audience’s goal.  
 
Conclusion  
This study sought to examine the diversity among terrorist group-types and to convey that 
there is a diversity of group choices and actions. It also sought to examine whether the waves 
of terrorism theorization were supported by empirics, and whether the dawn of the internet 
affected the use of less discriminate tactics. This study used a new dataset based on the GTD to 
tests the hypotheses put forth in this study.  
This study did find evidence to suggest that there is variation among terrorist groups’ tactic 
choices by ideology. Groups’ likelihood of using a given tactic varied in each model. This is an 
indication that we should not treat all groups as though they make the same choices under 
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similar conditions. I also find that groups’ choices are mitigated by capability, as the majority of 
the group age variables are significant across models.  
This study also finds some evidence in support of Rapoport’s waves of terrorism theorization, 
but this is limited to the third and fourth waves, as this data were limited. However, not all of 
Rapoport’s expectations were supported by the data. For example, the predicted probability of 
bombing rose during the fourth wave, as expected, but the predicted probability of kidnapping 
decreased, counter to expectations. Finally, this study found that the internet age was 
associated with greater predicted probability of bombings. I expected that armed assaults 
would also be more likely in the age of the internet, but the post-estimation indicates that 
armed assaults are decreasing in likelihood after the emergence of the internet.  
While this study is a step towards understanding the diversity among terrorist group choices by 
ideology, more studies need to be done. This study was limited in the number of group-level 
variables considered. It would be greatly improved if additional factors were included, for 
example, whether the group was centralized or decentralized. Additional factors could help 
improve and strengthen the models. However, I would posit that this study’s greatest 









Study 2: Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection  
 
The terrorism scholarship has made strides in understanding the logic of terrorism, but there 
are still notable gaps in our understanding of terrorist actions. This study seeks to answer 
whether ideology mitigates target selection for transnational terrorist groups. Target selection 
is a key operational decision that groups make, and understanding the contributing factors that 
help determine terrorist targets is imperative to counter terrorist strategies. Terrorist groups 
are not uniform. Terrorist scholarship recognizes this diversity, but emphasizes the capabilities 
dimensions as an important difference impacting the success of terrorist organization. Other 
differences, including those related to the groups’ ideology, have been largely overlooked in the 
studies of terrorism. The ideological variation among groups impacts their goals and motives, 
and, therefore, mitigates their decisions, including their choices of targets. This study seeks to 
provide evidence to convey that ideology alters choices.  
Target selection has been a relatively understudied question in the terrorism literature, and in 
order to understand the relationship between operational decisions, like target choice, we need 
to further examine the question. Targets are only one aspect of terrorist operations, but they 
are critical for counter-terrorism considerations. Understanding whether ideology mitigates 
target choice also has counter-terrorism and preparedness implications. If we can associate the 
likelihood of target selection by group-type, then we can anticipate and potentially prevent 
future attacks.  
In order to examine the question of target selection by ideological group-type, the dataset 
developed by Ahmed (n.d.) was used. The dataset is an enhanced version of the Global 
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Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD was cleaned meticulously, and each terrorist group was 
categorized into a group-type based on their ideology. Two variables denoting group age were 
also created.   
For the purposes of this study, terrorism is defined as “the premeditated use or threat of 
violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through 
intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims” (Enders and Sandler, 
2000). This broadly inclusive definition is especially useful as I consider attacks on combatants, 
specifically the military, as being terrorist attacks. Targets in this study are comprised of six 
categories: (1) political, (2) civilian, (3) security, (4) business, (5) rival, and (6) infrastructure. 
These categories will be further discussed in the data section, but they represent a broad range 
of terrorist targets. Moreover, this study only examines transnational terrorist groups.  
Transnational groups are defined in congruence with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The 
GTD has three criteria for transnational groups, and they are classified as such if they meet one 
or more of these criteria); (1) if any of the victims are of another nationality than the country 
attacked, (2) if any of the perpetrators are of a different nationality than the location of the 
incident, and (3) if the group responsible orchestrated the incident from a country other than 
the country attacked (GTD Codebook, 2014). Any group discussed in this study meets 1 or more 
of these criteria. 
Before introducing the dataset and results, this paper will first review the theoretical literature 
pertaining to the division of groups into group-types and the role of ideology in target selection. 
Within this review, a number of hypotheses concerning target selection by the various 
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typologies will be put forth. The results will then be reviewed, and will include post estimation 
results. Finally, this study will discuss the implications of the results as well as the study’s 
limitations.  
Theoretical literature  
Division of groups  
Before reviewing the literature pertaining to the role of ideology in terrorist group decision 
making, one needs to understand the divisions within terrorist groups. As previously stated, 
terrorist groups are not harmonized entities. While we understand that groups all threaten or 
use violence to pursue their agenda, their motivations and actions vary. 
This study considers five main group-types and two mixed ideologies: nationalist/separatist 
(N/S), left wing (LW), right wing (RW), religious (R), environmental (E), nationalist/separatist 
and religious (NS/R), and nationalist/separatist and left wing (NS/LW). I chose this typology of 
terrorist group-types because it is based on the groups’ differences in ideology. The aim of this 
study is to understand how ideology shapes target choices. Nationalist/separatist groups are 
groups that seek to overtake the system of government currently in place, or they are groups 
which seek an autonomy and territorial integrity from a given country. Left wing groups are 
defined as groups with left-leaning and revolutionary ideologies; these groups generally 
support a socialist or communist ideology. Right wing groups defy left wing concepts like 
communism and socialism, and lean toward fascist, and at times, racist ideology. Religious 
groups are groups claiming to be guided in their actions by their given religion. Environmental 
groups are defined as groups who are guided by their missions to end to perceived animal 
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cruelty or ecological destruction. Mixed groups are groups who hold more than one ideology, 
and in this study, two of these mixed typologies are included: nationalist/separatist and 
religious and nationalist/separatist and left wing12. These groups are categorized in both 
ideological groups because they are guided by two ideologies. For example, the IRA is guided 
both by the pursuit of a united, independent Ireland, but it is also guided by Catholicism, 
making the group both nationalist/separatist and religious.  
However, there are other ways to conceptualize or categorize terrorist groups. Wilkinson 
(1986) for example, suggests that groups should be divided into four group types: (1) criminal, 
(2) psychological, (3) war, and (4) political. Wilkinson defines criminal groups as those who use 
terror as a means to material wealth, psychic groups are led by extreme, fanatical religious 
beliefs, war groups are groups who attack without abandon to defeat an enemy, and political 
groups are described as groups who will use systematic violence to achieve their political goals 
(Wilkinson, 1976; Poland, 1988). Wilkinson’s (1976) typologies are not limited by this initial 
classification. He also lists sub-group characteristics. For instance, political groups are further 
divided into three sub-types: (1) revolutionary, (2) sub-revolutionary13, and repressive 
(Wilkinson, 1976). The categorization system that Wilkinson created pays great attention to 
detail, but its weakness lies in its complexity. The amount of information required to classify 
                                                             
12 Ahmed (n.d.) notes that only two mixed group types were included in the dataset because they were the only 
balanced groups, if the groups do not share at least 10% of their observations, they bias the estimates within 
the model (Johnson, 2010).  




groups would be incredibly difficult to capture, given the clandestine nature of terrorist 
operations.  
Vasilenko (2005) breaks groups down into five types: (1) political, (2) separatist, (3) nationalist, 
(4) religious, and (5) criminal. While no typology can hope to provide a classification of terrorist 
group types that are both comprehensive and exclusive, Vasilenko’s omission of environmental 
groups is notable. Environmental groups are less common, but they do perpetrate devastating 
attacks. To ignore those would be an exclusion of a terrorist group-type that has perpetrated a 
large number of attacks. However, what is most interesting about Vasilenko’s (2005) groupings 
is the variation in scope. For example, he differentiates politically motivated groups from 
nationalist or separatist groups, even though one could say that both nationalists and 
separatists are politically motivated. Political motivation would be inherent to terrorist groups; 
nationalist and separatist groups would fall under the umbrella of political groups. However, his 
inclusion of criminal groups is also interesting, because it would suggest that his definition of 
terrorism includes financial aim, as opposed to a social or political aim.  
Flemming, Schmid and Stohl (1988) are concerned with this variation in terrorist group types, 
but this could be a simplistic assessment of the state of the literature. Typologies vary because 
studies vary. Scholars are not pursuing the same questions, and it is therefore unfair to expect 
them to standardize typologies. However, standardization can be useful in developing the 
terrorism literature. Scholars studying ideology could use the same categorizations, and studies 
examining capability could use the same groupings. Given that the current literature is 
somewhat minimal regarding the actions and choices of terrorist typologies, this could be more 
easily achieved.  
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The Role of Ideology in Target Selection  
Converse (1964) used the term ‘belief system’ to describe the concept of ideology, and he 
defined it as the “configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound 
together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence”. Converse (1964) explains 
constraints as personal limitations on thoughts and behavior. In essence, one’s opinions are 
rooted in a belief system, and regardless of the situation, opinions will be formed with regard to 
ideology. This definition may be imperfect and somewhat simplistic14, but it is one that 
introduces the inherent power of ideology. In the previous section, the various ways to 
categorize groups by ideology were discussed. My conceptualization of groups is rooted in 
ideological differences, so that I may test the link between ideology and target choice.  
Ideology is a powerful concept that can guide both an individual’s and a group’s actions, 
“ideology establishes who the enemy is” (Silke, 2010). Ideology has long been the justification 
for political action, including war. Stephen Sykes (1992) suggests that soldiers going into battle 
have long been memorialized and motivated by Christian teachings and sayings, “there has 
been a close relationship between the sort of commitment a soldier, or indeed a civilian, 
exhibits in his or her presumed readiness to die in battle and the Christian language of 
sacrifice”. Worldviews have long guided decisions, and actions, both violent and non-violent. As 
with terrorist groups, states or other groups may want to take action to achieve their goals, but 
they are limited by their resources.  
                                                             
14 It assumes a great deal about people’s positions (there is a high degree of extrapolation), and it 
assumes that people make all their decisions based on their ideology.  
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Although this study is focused on terrorist groups, it is still focused on group-level dynamics. As 
with any other group, individuals may enter into the group with variations of the same 
ideology. They share enough to form a collective, and they take on the collective vison (Drake, 
2007). The resulting group takes on an identity, takes a name, and sets goals. The establishment 
of the group is the establishment of the group ideology and worldview. Members who enter 
into it are committing to fulfilling the given vision. Leaders and, or group members form the 
collective. As the collective grows, members take on the group identity (Drake, 2007). This is 
why ideology plays such an integral role in decision making, as it informs the collective 
worldview and consequent actions of a given group.  
This study firmly posits that ideology lead to a deliberate selection of targets. Targets are not 
random, and they are not accidental (Asal et al, 2009; Drake, 2007). In essence, every target 
selection is filtered through the worldview, and capabilities, of the group. Groups are rational 
actors that make calculations based on their objectives. One can think that that is why Calle and 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) suggest that target selection grants us insight into terrorist groups and 
their motivations. This study is not suggesting that terrorism is an acceptable act, or that it is a 
measured response to grievances. It is suggesting that the perpetrators consider terrorist acts 
as a rational, logical means of communicating their message and furthering their goals.  
It is imperative that one recognizes that the link between ideology and target selection is 
mitigated by resources and opportunity. Asal and Hastings (2009) seek to balance these factors 
in their examination of terrorist attacks on maritime targets, “while some terrorist 
organizations traffic in drugs, most don't even though they have the capability to engage in 
both terrorist and criminal behavior. For organizations, the frame in which they see the world is 
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important for understanding their organizational choices”. Even though Asal and Hastings 
(2009) seek to convey that capability is a strong factor in operational decisions, they 
acknowledge that ideology is often a driving force for decision making within a terrorist group. 
This is not to say, however, that individual members of a terrorist group are all led by ideology, 
but rather that the group’s actions are guided and instructed by ideological beliefs. To be clear, 
capability is conceived as resources meeting opportunity. Toft et al (2010) also find that 
terrorists attack vulnerable targets, suggesting that capability is a mitigating factor in the choice 
of targets. Toft et al (2010) examine energy infrastructure targets specifically, and find that they 
are selected based on their inability to be secured at all times. Consider a ship transporting oil, 
how can it be secured at all times? Ideology drives decisions, but choices cannot be made 
unless the group is capable of completing the attack.  
Figure 1: Theorization of ideology’s impact on operational decisions  
 
 
Boaz Ganor (2008) suggests that it is motivation, operational capability and a window of 













and capability. Ideology is the driving force, but it is capability that mitigates a given terrorist 
group’s actions, as illustrated by Figure 1. Capability, in this study, is measured by the years a 
group survives. Cronin (2006) finds that 90% of groups dissipate before they reach the one-year 
milestone. Cronin’s (2006) findings are partly due to the prevalence of competition and partly 
due to availability of resources. This statistic is also informative of choices that groups make. In 
order to survive, groups need to be extreme at first. For example, Horowitz (2010) finds that 
the likelihood of use of suicide bombing is 50-60% in year one of a group’s life, but that number 
falls to 27% in year five (Horowitz, 2010). This is suggestive that groups are mindful of their 
survival, and consequently shape their decisions to ensure their viability and survival. 
Therefore, this study measures capability with a variable noting the one-year and five-year 
milestones. In essence, there is an expectation that capability mitigates ideological goals.  
H1: Groups that survive one year or less are more likely to attack less aggressive and complex 
targets, such as infrastructure targets 
H2: Groups that survive five or more years are more likely to attack more aggressive and 
complex targets, such as security targets to continue to appease their target audience  
Capability is integral to the decision making process for terrorist groups, but another important 
mitigating factor is the given group’s target audience. For example, multiple terrorist groups 
have attacked or threatened to attack the Olympic games, but not the Paralympic games (Silke, 
2010). Silke (2010) posits that this is because terrorist groups are calculating and rational actors 
that will only make decisions that further their goals.  
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Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) also find that resources, coupled with target audience 
restrictions, guide terrorist choices. They examine two nationalist/separatist groups, the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) and find that both 
groups wanted to garner attention, but did not want to do so at the cost of their audience, so 
they avoided civilian or accidental deaths. Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) theorize that 
collateral deaths would be unacceptable to the groups’ target audiences, and planned their 
attacks accordingly. However, Hoffman (1995) theorizes that although some groups may be 
mitigated by their target audience, for religious groups, their target audience may be god, and 
this leads to a notion of ‘total war’ whereby religious groups are unbound by the perception of 
their earthly target audience. While Hoffman (1995) makes an interesting argument, one could 
still argue that groups need the support of a target audience, even if it is just to provide 
material resources to ensure groups’ survival.  
As the previous paragraphs suggest, group-types do not make decisions with the same 
calculations. Consider left wing groups, they generally do not attack rival targets. Left wing 
groups are generally revolutionary in nature, and seek the change of a political system, thus 
targeting other terrorist groups would be contrary to their goals and objectives. Within the 
context of this data, left wing groups only attack rivals 11 times, while religious groups attack 
rivals 114 times. Nationalists/Separatists seek to make country-level changes, and will likely 
attack forces that stand in their way, such as the police or national military (Drake, 2007). Right 
wing groups are generally threatened by change and want to maintain the status quo, and so 
they are more likely to target what they perceive as a threat to life as they know it, including 
civilians and government offices (Drake, 2007). Meanwhile, religious groups attack other groups 
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because they view their message as divine and worthy, whereas other messages pose a threat. 
It is essential for their message to reign supreme so threats need to be eliminated. Piazza 
(2009) also argues that religious groups are much less discriminate in their target choices 
because their attack is against a way or life, or culture, which makes any target legitimate. 
Scholars have found that environmental terrorist groups do not generally intend to cause harm, 
as it is contrary to their worldview (Taylor, 1998). Environmental groups, in principle, hope to 
avoid any harm, but Ackerman’s (2010) study reveals that the ELF (Environmental Liberation 
Front) sought to avoid collateral damage, but it was acceptable if measures were taken to avoid 
the risks.  
H1: There will be differences in target selection by group-type 
 H1a: Left wing groups will be less likely to attack rival targets 
 H1b: Right wing groups will likely attack targets they view as threatening the status quo, 
such as civilian and political targets 
 H1c: Religious groups will attack any given target, as they consider any target legitimate  
 H1d: Environmental groups will be more likely to attack targets that do not have the 
potential to harm human life, like business targets after hours  
Data and Methods 
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As previously mentioned, this paper utilizes an enhanced version of the GTD. It covers the years 
1970-201315, and has a total of 25,735 observations16. 1053 groups are included in this study. 
The unit of analysis is incident-year. Systematically using TRAC (Terrorism Research and Analysis 
Consortium) and TOPs (Terrorist Organization Profiles), the groups were sorted into ideological 
categories of religious, nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, and environmental, and 
coded accordingly17 by Ahmed (n.d.). However, groups are not necessarily composed of one 
group-type. Some groups have two categorizations, for example they are both 
nationalist/separatist and religious, like the Lebanese-based group Amal. Amal was formed in 
the hopes of carrying out two goals, (1) bring greater respect to Shiite Muslims in the Lebanese 
south, and (2) pressure the government to allocate greater resources to the area (TRAC, 2015). 
Amal was rooted in religion and nationalism, and it is consequently coded as both categories; 
this ensures appropriate representation of the groups. Groups were categorized in each group-
type they belonged to. There were no groups in the dataset that had more than two ideological 
categorizations.  
Dependent variables 
There are six binary dependent variables included in this study. They each represent a category 
of targets attacked by terrorist groups. The dependent variables are (1) political targets, (2) 
civilian targets, (3) security targets, (4) business targets, (5) rival targets, and (6) infrastructure 
targets; if the given target is used, a value of 1 is given, 0 if otherwise. The GTD tracks targets 
                                                             
15 1993 is excluded as it is excluded from the GTD due to insufficient data 
16 Only a select number of variables from this dataset were used for the sake of this study  
17 TRAC and TOPs provide descriptions of groups, including their goals, intentions and attacks.  
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for each terrorist incident, and these targets were examined and then place in one of the six 
target types. There was no overlap in the categorization process.  
Political targets include any domestic or international governmental targets, including a 
government building, government employees, government events, and foreign missions or 
embassies. Civilian targets include educational institutions such as schools or teachers, 
journalists and media entities, NGOs, private citizens and private property, religious 
institutions, and tourists. These targets are unrelated to a nation’s security apparatus. Security 
targets include attacks on the military or police. Business targets include any attacks on 
businesses, this includes attacks on business patrons. Rival targets are defined as other terrorist 
groups or non-state militias. Finally, infrastructure targets include attacks on food or water 
supplies, airports, maritime facilities like ports or ships, telecommunication infrastructure such 
as cell phone towers, transportation systems and utility facilities like oil pipelines or electric 
substations (GTD, 2015).  
Independent variables  
The key independent variables in the models are the group-types. In order to gain a more 
substantive interpretation of results, the most numerous group-type, nationalist/separatist, is 
used as a reference group. The remaining group types, including mixed typologies are included 
in the models, also as dummy variables. Left wing, right wing, religious, environmental, 
nationalist/separatist and religious, and nationalist/separatist and left wing.  
Also, the variable denoting survival past one year is included. Cronin (2006) finds that 90% of 
groups do not survive past one year, so this variable is a mark of viability and resources. Thirdly, 
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a variable denoting survival of five or more years is also included as a measure of viability and 
resources. This extended survival can give us insight into the capability of groups that beat the 
statistics. These viability variables act as proxies for resources for terrorist groups. These are 
the only group level controls included in the model18.  
Method 
Given that the dependent variables are binary, maximum likelihood models are used to test the 
hypotheses. Logistic regression indicates the probability that the dependent variable is equal to 
1. The six models in Table 1 are all time series, cross sectional models. The results in Table 1 will 
be represented as odds ratios. If coefficient values are greater than one, then the given 
coefficient is considered positive. If the coefficient value is less than one, then the coefficient is 










                                                             
18 Although there are other group level variables available in replication datasets, I do not think that they 
are accurate. For example, estimates of income or group members, but given that terrorist groups 
evolve or dissipate quickly, I do not think these are accurate measures – especially given the clandestine 
nature of their pursuits.   
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Table 1: Target selection maximum likelihood models 
       














Left wing 0.653** 1.156* 0.42** 3.355** 0.954 0.443** 
  0.032 0.072 0.064 0.196 0.644 0.034 
Right wing 1.508** 1.188 0.1** 0.256** 2.272 1.344* 
  0.117 0.124 0.059 0.043 1.912 0.128 
Religious 0.682** 1.183* 3.252* 0.831* 8.965** 1.029 
  0.038 0.069 0.289 0.065 4.328 0.082 
Environment 0.736* 1.51** 0.119** 7.904**  0.093** 
  0.084 0.186 0.085 1.071  0.036 
NS/Religious 0.412** 2.282** 1.916** 1.025 21.066** 0.723** 
  0.028 0.14 0.187 0.08 9.871 0.072 
NS/LW 0.331** 0.712** 5.858** 1.694** 1.34 1.658** 
  0.02 0.05 0.513 0.103 0.816 0.113 
One year 0.294** 3.039** 5.882** 7.971**  0.953 
  0.021 0.28 2.294 1.041  0.083 
Five years 0.919 0.555** 3.222** 2.013** 4.646 0.457** 
  0.052 0.036 0.517 0.136 4.719 0.033 
Years 0.972** 1.058** 1.03** 0.96** 1.001 0.984** 
  0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.002 
Constant 3.46e+24** 
3.21e-
50** 7.62e-29** 1.17e+33** 0.00004 1.06e+13** 
  1.17E+25 1.23E-49 4.00E-28 4.72E+33 0.0006 5.00E+13 
        
N 18413 18413 18413 18413 15794 18413 
LR chi2 2478.64 2367.16 2061.38 2761.32 190.46 668 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R2 0.1084 0.1186 0.1677 0.1478 0.1264 0.0501 
       
Notes: 
** P value < .001; * P value < .05 
Results in odd ratios; Account for time by including years as a control; Nationalist/Separatists is 
the reference group for group-types; Standard errors are included below coefficients in italics; 
Empty cells are an indication of perfect prediction of failure. Variable description can be found 






This study theorized that there would be differences across group-types in terms of their choice 
of targets, and this is evident when looking at the six models. Left wing groups, relative to 
nationalist/separatist groups, have a 0.653 lower odds ratio, ceteris paribus, of attacking 
political targets while right wing groups, relative to nationalist/separatist groups have a 1.508 
higher odds ratio of attacking political targets, ceteris paribus. This is just one example, but the 
diversity is evident in each model, thus providing support for H1. 
This study also expect that left will groups would be less likely to attack rival targets. Model 5 
indicated no support for this, as the left wing variable is insignificant, making the variable 
statistically equivalent to zero. However, this variable is relative to nationalist/separatist 
groups, so it does not illustrate a complete negation of the expectation set forth by H1a.  
Right wing groups were also expected to attack civilian and political targets, but there are 
mixed results indicated in the models. Right wing groups, as noted above, do have a higher 
likelihood of attacking political targets, but the right wing variable in the civilian targets model 
is insignificant. This perhaps indicates that political targets are more suited to achieving the 
goals of right wing groups.  
I also theorized that religious groups would attack any target, as they view any target as 
legitimate. The religious variable is significant across Models 1-5, but not Model 6. The religious 
variable is positive and significant in Models 2, 3, and 5. This suggests that relative to 
nationalist/separatists, religious groups have a 1.183 higher odds ratio of attacking civilian 
targets, 3.252 higher odds ratio of attacking security targets, and a 8.965 higher odds ratio of 
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attacking rival targets, ceteris paribus. Religious groups are not more likely to attack political or 
business targets, relative to nationalist/separatists. 
Finally, I expected that environmental groups would be more likely to attack business targets. 
Environmental groups generally try to avoid any harm to individuals, and they have historically 
tended to attack businesses after hours. There is support for this in Model 4. Relative to 
nationalist/separatists, environmental groups have a 7.904 higher odds ratio of attacking 
business targets, ceteris paribus. The large coefficient is further indicative of the likelihood of 
environmental groups choosing to target businesses. 
Interestingly, there is a perfect prediction of failure for the one-year variable in Model 5 while 
the five-year variable is positive, but insignificant. Conceivably, capability does not play a role 
when making the decision to attack a rival. However, as expected, groups that survive five or 
more years have a higher odds ratio of attacking more complex targets, like security targets. I 
expect this to be a show of force and strength to further pander to their respective target 
audiences.  
To further examine these findings, post-estimation graphs were created to illustrate the 















                                                             
19 NS: Nationalist/Separatist; LW: Left wing; RW; Right wing; R: Religious; E: Environmental; NSR: Nationalist 
separatist and religious; NSLW: Nationalist separatist and left wing. As can be observed, not all group-types are 
significant in Table 1, but they are all represented in the graphs above except in the case of perfect prediction of 
failure. Even when coefficients are insignificant, we cannot assume that they are equal to zero. This is why they are 



























































































Graph 1 represents the predicted probability of attacking political targets, by group-type. The 
graph suggests that, over time, the predicted probability of attacking political targets has 
declined for all group-types. Most notably, right wing groups have the highest predicted 
probability of choosing political targets. The predicted probability of a given target, as can be 
seen in all the graphs, varies over time. For example, in the case of Graph 1, we note that right 
wing groups have approximately a 0.62 predicted probability of attacking political targets in 
1970, but that declines to approximately 0.37 in 2013, ceteris paribus.  
Graph 2 represents the predicted probability of attacking civilian targets, by group-type. Unlike 
Graph 1, Graph 2 shows an increase in predicted probability of attacking civilian targets across 
all group-types. NS/Religious groups have the highest likelihood of choosing civilian targets. The 
confidence intervals of right wing groups do not overlap with the predicted probability of other 
groups, suggesting that right wing groups behave uniquely from other groups.  
Graph 3 represents the predicted probability of attacking security targets, by group-type. Unlike 
the other graphs, in Graph 3, four of the group-types have predicted probabilities that have 


















































Graph 6: Predictive Margins of Group-Type with 95% CIs
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probability of attacking security targets, followed by religious groups, then NS/Religious groups, 
and right wing groups. However, the graph also suggests an overall trend that the predicted 
probability of attacking security target is on the incline for all groups, albeit not at the same 
rate.  
Graph 4 represents the predicted probability of attacking business targets, by group-type. The 
graph conveys a trend of decline in the predicted probability of attacking business, across 
groups. However, the rate of decline varies by group-type. Environmental groups have the 
highest likelihood of attacking businesses, as expected, but left wing and NSLW groups also 
have predicted probabilities with confidence intervals that do not overlap with other 
predictions. Environmental groups have approximately 0.7 predicted probability of attacking 
businesses in 1970, but that declines to approximately 0.32 by 2013.  
Graph 5 represents the predicted probability of attacking rival targets, by group-type. This 
graph is unique in that it conveys very large confidence intervals. Consequently, the predicted 
probabilities cannot differentiate by group-type.  
Graph 6 represents the predicted probability of attacking infrastructure targets, by group-type. 
This graph suggests that there is an overall stasis in the predicted probability of attacking 
infrastructures over time. Although NSLW groups have the highest predicted probability of 
attacking infrastructure targets, the group-type’s confidence intervals overlap with those of 
right wing groups. However, left wing groups, while the second least likely group to attack 
infrastructure targets, are distinctive in that the group-type’s confidence intervals do not 
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overlap with any other group. Left wing groups are associated with approximately 0.8 predicted 
probability of attacking infrastructures in 1970, but that declines to approximately 0.6 by 2013.  
Limitations and conclusion 
This study focused on understanding operational decision making at the group level, specifically 
examining target choice by ideological group-type. This study sought to convey that terrorist 
groups do not make the same choices and they are not equal in capability, and therefore it is 
illogical to treat them as a uniform entity. The findings of this study further assert that claim. 
Religious groups, for example, are the most likely group-type to attack rival targets, whereas 
environmental groups have never done so in the context of this data.  
Moreover, the post-estimation graphs in this study suggest, overall, that civilian and security 
targets seem to be increasingly chosen by all group-types over time, whereas there is a decline 
in the choice of political, business, and infrastructure targets. These are only few examples of 
the differences among group-types with regards to target selection. Consequently, the 
terrorism scholarship needs to continue to address this diversity in future studies.  
This diversity not only improves our understanding of terrorist operational decisions, but it also 
has implications for counter-terrorism measures. Having provided evidence that civilian and 
security targets are increasingly likely targets, states or other counter-terrorism forces could 
take greater measures to protect those specific targets. It assists states in the allocation of 
resources to aid in the prevention of terrorist attacks. Not only do we understand that these 
targets are at greater risk, but we also understand who is the most likely perpetrator. For 
example, NSLW groups are the most likely to attack security targets. If states are suffering 
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terrorism at the hands of a groups meeting the NSLW criteria, then it is likely that that group 
will attack a security target.   
Moreover, this study does examine decision-making at the group-level, but future studies could 
also add more context by adding country-level factors. However, this is not to say that 
additional group-level factors could not increase our understanding. The clandestine nature of 
terrorism makes it difficult to unearth group dynamics, but added factors, such as strength of 















Study 3: Religion and Politics: Examining the Impact of Faith on Political Participation20 
 
Since the last quarter of the 20th century, religion has asserted itself as a powerful social force 
dispelling the forecasts of its imminent decay under the impact of modernization. A global 
religious resurgence has transformed many aspects of national and global politics, including 
education, human rights, and transnational activism. Although religious influence has been 
noted in many areas, including democratization and social movements (Banchoff, 2008; Bellin, 
2008; Driessen, 2014; Fox and Sandler 2004; Nexon, 2011; Philpott, 2000; Thomas, 2005; Toft, 
Philpott, and Shah, 2011), much of the academic and political attention has focused on the use 
of religious rhetoric and symbolism to promote mobilization in violent conflict (Henne, 2012; 
Pearce, 2005; Shah and Toft, 2006; Toft, 2007; Toft et al. 2011). The most striking, if not 
unsurprising, trend in the literature has placed Islam within a “securitization paradigm” 
approaching it as an issue of security and Muslims as potential agents of conflict (Pew Research 
Center, 2014; Swensson, 2013; Tepe and Demirkaya, 2011). 
If some scholars have argued that religion has had an indelible impact on state politics and 
international relations, others have called the impact of faith into question arguing that 
religion is merely the marker for identifying a social group, and any relationship between 
religion and conflict is spurious (Armstrong, 2014; Bloom, 2007, Cavanaugh, 2009; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Whether or not the impact of faith extends beyond 
political violence on other forms of political engagement is another subject that has received 
                                                             
20 Co-authored with Prof. Mariya Omelicheva 
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little systematic and cross-national examination21. This study purports to fill in this gap. In the 
interest of cultivating a broader and more comprehensive knowledge of the role of religion as 
a multifaceted force, it examines the impact of religion on various types of individuals’ political 
participation.   Much of the scholarship on religion and politics has focused on the country-
level analyses. This study uses longitudinal data from the aggregated World Values Survey 
(WVS) to examine the relationship between religion and politics at the individual level but 
controlling for contextual country-level factors in a multi-level research design. Relying on the 
previous WVS research, it utilizes a composite measure of religiosity to examine whether 
religion engages individuals politically. By including measures of the different types of religion, 
the paper also aims to explore if some religions have a greater impact on political participation.  
Religion is a term that eludes a textbook definition. Most definitions are problematic for 
several reasons. First, they imply uniformity across religions and conceal immense diversity 
within a particular faith. For instance, if a definition lists a belief in a deity as one of the 
characteristics of religion, it excludes Buddhism because it does not meet this criterion. 
Secondly, most definitions emphasize existential issues that are less relevant to social scientists 
interested in the impact of religion on politics and society (Fox and Sandler 2004, 2). Following 
Fox and Sandler (2004), we assume that religion influences human behavior and focus our 
effort on discovering these influences, rather than on constructing a specific definition of the 
term. After we review the debate over the impact of religion in the first section of the study, 
                                                             
21 The impact of religion has been examined in the studies of voting behavior (Hayes, 1995; Lijphart, 
1979; Rose and Urwin, 1969; Roemer, 1998). However, beyond the general expectations that religious 
voters are more conservative in their views, the impact of religiosity on political views and behavior is 




we detail such influences in section two. Section three discusses the research design of the 
study followed by the presentation and discussion of empirical findings.   
Debate over the impact of religion  
That religion would ebb before the juggernauts of the modern world – science, democracy, 
economic development, and education – had been a scientific truism for a long time 
(Brathwaite and Bramsen, 2011; Driessen, 2013, 21; Gill, 2001; Tift, Philpot, and Shah, 2011, 1). 
A classical view on this relationship can be found in the works of influential Western social 
thinkers, including Comte, Durkheim, Freud, Marx, Voltaire, and Weber, to name a few who 
rejected divine explanations. Instead, they believed that rational, scientific, and legalistic 
thought would replace religion as the basis for understanding and managing the world. 
Modern social scientists followed in the footsteps of these thinkers and proposed theoretical 
paradigms predicting the erosion of religion’s significance in the lives of individuals and 
societies (Fox and Sandler, 2004). Modernization theory, which dominated political science 
thinking from the late 1950s to the 1970s, posited that the various forces of modernization 
would extinguish primordial factors, such as ethnicity and religion, in politics and society. If 
modernization theory was largely preoccupied with ethnicity, its sociological analogue – 
secularization theory – focused on religion. It predicted a general decline in religion for the 
same reasons modernization theory portended the demise of ethnicity. Science and modern 
medicine would replace religion’s traditional role of interpreting the world. Technical, rational, 
and empirical criteria would replace religious dogmas and norms. The “will of the people” 
would displace religion as a source of state legitimacy (Fox and Sandler, 2004; Toft, Philpott, 
and Shah, 2011).  
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The main forces that facilitate the secularization process have been theorized in several 
frameworks. Functionalist scholars have pointed out that access to a wide range of non-
religious goods that become available thank to modernization will decrease people’s demand 
for traditional religious good. Technological advances will reduce the need for prayers, and 
visitation of the places of workshop will decline with the rise in modern means of 
entertainment (Driessen, 2013; Fox and Sandler, 2004). Other scholars, particularly those 
working in the Weberian tradition, have emphasized the structural changes caused by 
modernization, including the separation of religion and state, which further reduces the sphere 
of religious influence. The opposition to the idea of religious authority in politics has been 
bolstered by the rise of classical liberalism and critical theory accompanying the processes of 
democratization. The philosophic tradition expressed in the works of Mill, Rousseau, Kant, 
Rawls, and Habermas has argues that decision making in a liberal democratic society should be 
free of religious reasoning or values (Driessen, 2013; Fox and Sandler, 2004). As cogently 
summarized by Rawls (1993), “take the truths of religion off the political agenda”. 
Contrary to the prognosis of secularization theory, religious trends and events in the modern 
world have revealed the tenacity of individual religious beliefs, and growing religious influence 
on the institutions and politics of the modern states (Driessen, 2013). In spite of the 
expectations of liberal philosophy, the fully institutional separation of religion and state has 
never occurred even in established democracies (Fox, 2008; Grim and Finke, 2006). Economic 
development has not undermined religious participation (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Religions 
have entered public debate, in this way influencing policymaking and the shape of democratic 
life (Casanova, 1994). Recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa that toppled 
69 
 
long-standing regimes and brought Islamist-oriented parties to positions of power cast further 
doubt on the secularization thesis.  
Religion has reemerged in its social and political influence by the same factors that 
secularization theory predicted would beget its demise. Modernization has allowed the state 
to increase its sphere of influence, but it has exerted similar impact on religion fostering the 
contact and competition between the two. Modern political systems, particularly those in 
democratic states, provided avenues for avenues for religious’ sectors participation in politics. 
Rapid progress in communications and technology afforded religious groups an opportunity to 
disseminate their view and learn from the actions of other religious organizations. The 
proliferation of religious trends together with the freedom of choice in many societies to select 
one’s own religion has led to an increase in religiosity and religious following (Fox and Sandler, 
2004; Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011). All in all, modernization has brought about changes in 
religious systems and beliefs, but not necessarily extinguished them.  
If many agree that religion has become and in likelihood will continue to be a vital political and 
social force, disagreements persist about the nature of its impact. Over its long history, religion 
has fostered some of the most dramatic changes in human history by mobilizing people to 
resist oppression and unjust rule (Finke and Harris, 2012). It has also curbed social change by 
supporting traditional institutions and oppressive status quos (Aminzade and Perry, 2001). 
There are numerous, well-documented cases of the stabilizing role of religions, just like there 
are many instances of religiously inspired violence and war. Still, little is known about the 
conditions that contribute to religious mobilization. Why did the Bosnian crises take on a 
religious current, while conflicts between Turkish Muslims and Greek Christians in Cyprus 
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remained secular? While religion provided a mobilizing platform for the Sinhalese Buddhists 
during the Sri Lankan civil war, it was absent from the Tamil Hindus’ rhetoric. There are various 
explanations as to the varied religious effects on conflict or political participation, Glazier 
(2015) finds that religious individuals, who he calls providential believers, are usually less likely 
to be politically active. However, Glazier (2015) also finds that when providential believers are 
confronted with politically laden sermons by their religious leaders, they become more 
politically engaged. Religions may impact the tone or motivation of a given political action, but 
those actions are also guided by levels of religiosity.  
  
Arguably, no other religions’ political impact has received greater attention in recent years 
than that of Islam. In fact, much of the increase in religion’s rising political profile has been due 
to the violent conflict and events attributed to Islam. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the 
frequency and intensity of suicide attacks in different parts of the world, relentless sectarian 
violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria, and the rise of Daesh have captivated the 
attention of scholars, policy makers, and the general public as they struggle to fathom the 
rationale for the use of mass violence. Although all religions have the potential to inspire 
violence (see Finke and Harris, 2012; Fox, 2013; Grim and Finke, 2007; Piazza, 2009; Sandal and 
Fox, 2013, Testas, 2004), such events and episodes tend to confirm the worst stereotypes 
about Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2003). Non-violent activism inspired by Islam or other religions or 
ways in which doctrinal differences translate in individuals’ political behavior have so far 
received considerably less attention. This is especially interesting, as religiously is usually 
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negatively associated with non-violent forms of political participation (Ayers and Hofstetter, 
2008).  
Theoretical framework  
As discussed in the preceding section, religion has long provided an impetus for a wide range of 
social action. This study uses the term “political participation” to denote any action taken by an 
individual in the political realm. Political participation ranges from signing a petition to 
attending a demonstration to participation in boycotts. What unites all forms of political 
participation is that it involves activities of ordinary citizens participating in the political process 
by making their opinions and voices heard.  
Although the doctrinal differences and specificities of religious praxis can lead to important 
differences in political activism within and across religious denominations as well as in 
comparison to secular political activism. The social action itself demonstrated some 
consistency across actors, systems of beliefs, and dynamics and mechanisms of contention. In 
other words, neither religious political participation not Islamic, Christian, or Hinduism is sui 
generis (Wiktorowicz, 2003). It, therefore, can be studies using the modes of inquiry developed 
for understanding political contention and collective action, in general (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2003).  
Scholars of contentious politics have identified a number of properties that hold across a wide 
variety of collective action. For analytical purposes, we group the most prominent 
characteristics of political participation in the following categories: motive, political 
opportunity structure, incentive, and frames (see Figure 1). These concepts appeared in 
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different schools of study of contentious politics from the 1960s to present. They describe a 
range of considerations and strategic evaluations affecting decisions making by rational actors. 
They also allow researchers to go beyond a purely instrumentalist perpective to explore the 
expressive dimensions of religious conviction in the processes of contention. Importantly, 
these concepts offer the shared language for comparative analysis of political participation and 
theory building22.  




























































                                                             
22 Although, several prominent scholars called for the integration of research on political and religious 
contention (e.g., Show and Marshall 1984) and elimination of an artificial divide between the studies of 
religion and non-religious movements (e.g., Hanigan 1991; Williams 1994), others have cautioned 
against any attempt at developing a unifying framework for understanding all forms of contentious 
politics. The reasons for this objection are that a shared framework precludes systematic comparison 
between different types of contention and cloaks important differences between religious and non-





Motive refers to a need or a grievance that causes a person to act. Although all societies have 
grievances, different types of collective action arise only in a subset of social contests 
characterized by conditions in which individual discontent can be mobilized. This refers to the 
opportunity structure for a motivated actor to engage in political action. Incentive denotes a 
strategic evaluation that the actor will be better off from engaging in political action; it refers 
to the consideration of benefits and costs of political participation. With the proliferation of 
interest in the role of ideas, identities, and beliefs, researchers of contentious politics turned to 
the analysis of frames that mediate the impact of various background conditions on people’s 
decisions to engage in political action. Frames render specific understandings of solutions to 
individuals’ grievances and provide the rationale needed to encourage their participation in 
different forms of contention (Benford and Snow, 2000; Chandler, 2005). 
What is the role of religion in the framework of political opportunity structures, motives, 
incentives, and frames? Noting important quantitative and qualitative differences 
characterizing the world religions and impacting the ways in which they affect the followers’ 
course of political action or inactions, we propose several plausible links between religion and 
political participation. First, when religious issues with direct implications for lives and 
livelihood of the faithful enter the local or national agendas, they can provide a powerful 
motive for political participation, especially if they appear on the backdrop of religious 
discrimination, underrepresentation on religious grounds, or existing inter-religious tensions 
(Vullers and Wegenast, 2011). Religious needs, demands, and grievances offer a ground for 
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religious politicization that makes religion socially relevant for the believers making them 
consider political action.  
Second, churches and religious movements can serve as effective mobilizing networks 
(Wiktorowicz, 2003). The scholars of religious movements have pointed out that resource 
opportunities available to churches and religious movements often place them at an advantage 
compared to secular movements. The church-based social movements may have a longer 
lifespan than other social movements, as they are less affected by shifts in public opinion or 
divisions among secular political elites (Aminzdale and Perry, 2001). They may benefit from 
exemptions from taxation and conscription. In many societies, state authorities recognize and 
respect the sanctity of religious spaces, even if they offer a forum for oppositional political 
mobilization (Aminzdale and Perry, 2001). Religiously based movements, organizations, and 
groups, in turn, can provide their congregations with various selective incentives for taking part 
in political action. The fear of damnation or exclusion enables religious organizations to exert 
considerable pressure on their members compelling them to act consistent with the 
organizations’ expectations and terms (Wald et al, 2005). 
Under authoritarian rule, religious groups become a natural vehicle for limited political 
participation. It has been noted that faith-based organizations, especially those operating 
within religions with decentralized power structures, are more difficult to repress than labor 
unions, secular political groups, mass media, or student organizations (Sahliyeh, 1990). 
Subsequently, contention through religious movements often represents the only option for 
confronting a sense of political exclusion in authoritarian states (Wiktorowicz, 2003).  
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In any form of political participation, a rational actor calculates their costs and benefits, and 
then chooses their best course of action (or inaction) that will result in the highest likelihood of 
benefit, with the lowest risk or cost. Religion, however, can confer an unusually demanding 
identity that changes the consequentialist logic of action. Some religions lay claim to every 
aspect of their adherents’ lives ranging from their political views and behavior, to dress codes 
and dietary restrictions. In conjunction with beliefs in the inferiority of other beliefs and 
conversion as the only means to removing the sources of spiritual pollution, the omnipresent 
religious identity can make costly actions appear as justifiable and rational. Under these 
circumstances, credible threats, including risks associated with physical harm, will offer a less 
effective deterrent for a faithful person than for a more secular one (Toft, 2007). For the 
religious leaders themselves, the costs of political participation, even if high from the 
standpoint of individual safety and resources spent on the communal mobilization, as far less 
than the losses incurred by inaction. With inaction, the religious leaders risk their communal 
authority, legitimacy and congregation (Wittenberg, 2006).  
Scholars who study religion and violence have pointed out that holy scriptures in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam strictly regulate the conduct of believers. The Old Testament, New 
Testament, and Quran promise considerable rewards for following the precepts of sacred tests 
and punishment for disobeying the divine laws. Subsequently, the faithful members are less 
likely to violate key tenets of their faith even if doing so would result in a better outcome, such 
as peace. Furthermore, both Christianity and Islam prioritize the religious self, which is eternal 
and immortal, over the temporal and mortal physical self. Therefore, sacrificing the temporary 
and moral for the sake of the eternal and immortal is not only rational but desirable. 
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Abrahamic religions prioritize the immortal self, while Buddhists believe that nirvana may be 
reached within their lifetimes. Nirvana is the ultimate goal of Buddhists, it is the ultimate form 
of enlightenment, akin to the Christian or Muslim concept of heaven (Collins, 1998). Given that 
Buddhists ultimate goals may be achieved within the course of their lives, we expect that 
Buddhists will be more concerned with political activity, while Abrahamic religions will not, 
relatively. We also expect that more institutionalized, structured, and centralized sects, like 
Evangelical Christians or Catholics, will be more politically active because their religious 
affiliation and organization will be a mobilizing force.  
The preceding discussion suggests the following hypotheses about the impact of religion on 
political participation: 
 H1: The members of religious organizations will be more likely to engage politically than 
non-members of religious groups 
 H2: Those identifying with Buddhism will be more likely to engage political activities 
compared to other religions 
The stronger an individual’s identity is tied to a particular faith (i.e. the stronger the individual’s 
religiosity is), the greater the likelihood that he or she will seek further exposure to religious 
teachings and become involved in the discussion and exchange of ideas over religious 
meanings, solutions, and alternative ways of viewing the world, including through membership 
in church and religious organizations. The ability of a religious organization to frame this 
debate in such a way that it resonates with the listeners’ grievances and their religious identity 
will determine success of its mobilizing efforts. Once the frame alignment is achieved, i.e. 
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individuals accept the group’s interpretations and solutions to the pending problems, they 
become more committed to its cause through participation in a variety of micro and macro 
mobilization activities, which can include various types of non-violent and violent action. This 
leads us to the final hypothesis: 
 H3: Higher levels of religiosity will be associated with higher levels of political 
participation  
The discussed theoretical framework also incorporates a number of other factors that 
motivate, incentivize, and provide opportunities for individuals’ political engagement. Political 
activism is a response to a grievance or need that provides motivation for political action.  
Scholars have debated the relative important of different precipitants for political action. Some 
argues that socioeconomic distress is the principal cause, while others pointed out a variety of 
forms of discrimination. The underlying assumption of these approached is that individual’s 
feeling of dissatisfaction with his/her life serves as a motive for political action. As churches 
and religious organizations serve as vehicles for individuals’ mobilization, so do other forms of 
voluntary associations. Political parties, in particular, have been the primary agents of electoral 
mobilization. Repression by the state will affect both incentives for engaging in political actions 
as well as the structure of political opportunities. 
Research design  
The analysis of the impact of religion on political participation is performed on data from the 
World Values Survey (WVS) 6 wave aggregate, which includes WVS 1981-1984, WVS 1990-
1994, WVS 1995-1998, WVS 2000-2004, WVS 2005-2009, and WVS 2010-2014. The Integrated 
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Values Survey (1981-2014) encompasses 367 surveys, 113 countries/regions, 1261 variables, 
and 507,779 cases23. The selection of the WVS data for this study generated more than 95,000 
cases as the first level and more than 65 countries at the second level. The temporal and 
spatial coverage of the WVS data includes more than 65% of the world’s population. The 
survey relies on national teams that follow the established survey protocol. Still, not all survey 
instruments and sampling procedures are identical (Inglehart et al., 2000). Despite these 
caveats, many of the survey items from the 1981 wave of the survey are asked in precisely the 
same way in each of the successive waves and in each of the participating countries. To 
maximize the reliability of the longitudinal analysis, we scanned the root surveys from all 
waves for questions with identical question wording and identical response categories across 
countries and time points. Unless otherwise noted, identical survey items were used to 
measure the variables.  
The summary of the dependent and independent variables is presented in the appendix. To 
measure the dependent variable of the study – political participation – we chose a survey item 
that asked respondents to indicate whether they done the following: signed a petition, joined 
boycotts, attended lawful demonstration, joined unofficial strokes, or occupying buildings or 
factories24. We created five binary variables coding positive responses with “1” and “0” 
otherwise.  
                                                             
23 World Values Survey 1981-2014 Longitudinal Aggregate v.20150418. World Values Survey Association 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: JDSystems, Madrid SPAIN.  
24 In addition to these items, the earlier waves survey asked whether respondents used personal 
violence or became involved in the destruction of property, such as breaking windows. We did not use 




In section two, we hypothesized that three manifestations of religion, namely, religiosity, 
religious affiliation, and membership in religious organizations, have an independent effect on 
political participation. Drawing on the previous research (Esmer, 2007), we used two measures 
of religiosity, which we alternated in the models. The first is an additive scale consisting of 
three dichotomous (0 and 1) questions.5 These questions are:  
(1) Religion is an important value for children to learn;  
(2) Attendance at religious services (one a week or more vs. less 
frequently);  
(3) Respondent defines himself/herself as a religious person vs. not 
religious or atheist  
The scale has a minimum value of 0 (not religious at all) and a maximum value of 3 (very 
religious). The second measure is the “Importance of God in one’s life scale”, which runs from 1 
to 10, with higher values indicating more importance of God in a respondents’ lives. To 
measure individual religious affiliation, we created 10 dummy variables where we assigned “1” 
if a given respondent chose Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Evangelical Christian, Hindu, Jewish, 
Orthodox, Protestant, or Catholic as their religious identity. We used a survey question that 
asked about respondents’ memberships in religious organizations to create a binary variable 
for membership in churches and religious organizations “1”, or “0” otherwise25. To measure 
                                                             
25 There is a slight discrepancy in wording of the questions and choices of responses between waves 1, 
3, 5 and 2, 4, and 6. In waves 1,3, and 5, respondents were asked if they belonged to churches and 
religious organizations (as well as a number of other voluntary associations), whereas in waves 2,4, and 
6, respondents were read a list of voluntary organizations and asked if they were active members, 
inactive members, or non-members of those types of organizations. If respondents in waves 1,3, and 5 
chose “belong” to an organization and in waves 2, 4, and 6 they chose “active member” in an 
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the “motive”, we used two survey items:  one asking respondents to indicate how satisfied 
they were with their life, and another one inquiring about respondent’s satisfaction with the 
financial situation in his/her household. Both items are measured on a scale from 1 
(“completely dissatisfied”) to 10 (completely satisfied”). The “financial satisfaction” scale also 
serves as a proxy for respondent’s subjective assessment of his/her economic well-
being/income.  To measure the structure of political opportunities, we included a binary 
variable denoting respondent’s  membership  in  political  parties  or  other  groups  (“1”  
indicating  membership),  and  created another binary variable denoting membership in one or 
more of the following voluntary associations: humanitarian or charitable organizations, 
education or art groups, trade unions, organizations concerned with human rights, 
environmentalist or animal welfare groups, youth work, sport or recreational groups, consumer 
groups, professional associations, and other voluntary groups. We also included a measure of 
political interest with the scale of importance of politics in one’s life: 1 (very important to 4 
(not at all)26, and demographic variables: age and marital status. 
 
We used three country-level variables to measure the structure of incentives and political 
opportunities for individual political action. The first one is GDP per capita measured in 
constant 2005 $US from the World Bank data27. The second variable measures a regime type 
                                                             
organization, we coded those responses as “1s” (membership).  If respondents in waves 1,3, and 5 did 
not chose “belong” to an organization and in waves 2, 4, and 6 they chose “inactive member” or “non-
member” in an organization, we coded those responses as “0s” (membership).  
26 An original scale contains six items. We adopted a limited scale to increase the number of observations in the 
model since questions about respondents’ beliefs in life after death, hell, and heaven were not included in several 
survey waves.   
27 Available here: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?page=5  
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with Polity IV scores. We used a modified version of the combined annual Polity variable, 
where all instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e. -66, -77, and -88) are converted to 
conventional polity scores ranging from -10 to 1028. Lastly, we used the Cingranelli and 
Richards Empowerment Rights index to control for the overall situation with civil and political 
rights in the country29. This is an additive index constructed from seven indicators of the 
freedoms of Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Speech, Religion, Assembly & 
Association, Workers’ Rights, and Electoral Self-Determination. The index ranges from 0 (no 
government respect for these rights) to 14 (full government respect for these rights).  
 
Given the hierarchical nature of our data, we have information on individuals (level 1 units) 
belonging to different countries (level 2 unites), we chose to perform a multi-level analysis. 
Multi-level models allow for the introduction of higher-level explanatory variables in this way 
voiding the ecological fallacy arising from the conflation of the levels of analysis, when 
inferences derived from one level are applied to another level. Ordering the data in a 
hierarchical model offers a clear picture of where (which level) and how effects are occurring.  
 
                                                             
28 Marshall, Monty G.,  Gurr,  Ted  Robert,  and  Keith  Jaggers,  “Polity  IV  Project:  Political  Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013.  Dataset  Users’  Manual”.  Center  for  Systemic  Peace,  
2014, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf    
29 Cingranelli  and  Richards,  “Measuring  the  Level,  Pattern,  and  Sequence  of  Government  Respect  
for  Physical  Integrity  Rights.”  When  CIRI  index  was  used  as  a  dependent  variable,  it  was 
excluded from the right-hand side of the equation. We also added the random coefficient (slope) to the 
models. A likelihood-ratio test showed that the models with the random coefficient were not 
significantly better than the models with just the random intercept. 
82 
 
We make the standard assumption that residuals at both levels follow a normal distribution 
with zero mean, which allows partitioning total variance in two components, a within-group 
component (σε2) and a between-group component (σμ2). In this random intercept model, the 
same relationship between different measures of religion and political participation holds for 
each country (same slope) but the intercept (β0 + μj) varies randomly across countries. Given 
the binary nature of our dependent variable, which takes 0/1 values, we used a mixed effects 







Table 1: Political participation with religiosity index 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
 Petition Boycott Demonstrate Strike Occupy 
Religiosity index 0.974** 0.963** 0.984** 0.948** 0.939** 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Life satisfaction 0.987** 0.974** 0.982** 0.968** 0.961** 
  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Importance of politics 0.722** 0.718** 0.699** 0.732** 0.75** 
  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.008 
Religious membership 1.067** 0.954* 0.963* 0.956* 0.98 
  0.018 0.015 0.015 0.02 0.028 
Political party member 1.923** 1.174** 1.928** 1.599** 1.653** 
  0.055 0.042 0.049 0.048 0.064 
Other memberships 1.159** 1.287** 1.498** 1.481** 1.325** 
  0.026 0.031 0.032 0.042 0.478 
Perception of freedom of 
choice 1.029** 1.023** 1.025** 1.028** 1.01* 
  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Christian 1.391* 1.498* 1.46* 1.16 1.221 
  0.199 0.223 0.218 0.378 0.718 
Buddhist 1.756** 1.206** 1.386** 1.092 1.022 
  0.098 0.063 0.069 0.08 0.112 
Evangelical 1.34** 0.897 1.025 0.88 0.803 
  0.073 0.051 0.054 0.077 0.09 
Hindu 1.11 1.021 0.978 0.792* 0.642** 
  0.061 0.055 0.053 0.058 0.068 
Jewish 1.542** 1.753** 1.538** 1.844** 1.182 
  0.171 0.178 0.15 0.212 0.206 
Orthodox Christian 1.385** 1.035 1.336** 1.088 0.911 
  0.049 0.039 0.045 0.051 0.073 
Protestant  1.55** 1.159** 1.173** 0.928 0.78** 
  0.053 0.04 0.037 0.042 0.055 
Catholic 1.359** 1.097* 1.207** 0.982 0.888 
  0.043 0.036 0.037 0.042 0.059 
Financial satisfaction 1.005 0.99* 0.981** 0.984** 0.985* 
  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Age 0.987** 0.984** 0.982** 0.978** 0.976** 
  0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0008 
Married 1.085** 1.029* 1.014 0.935** 0.876** 
  0.013 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.02 
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GDP per capita logged) 0.495** 0.818** 0.659** 1.459** 1.569** 
  0.018 0.031 0.213 0.055 0.143 
Polity score 0.964** 0.964** 0.98** 1.033** 0.949** 
  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.009 
Emancipatory index 1.01 1.042** 0.99 0.922** 0.889** 
  0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.018 
Constant 1680.325** 10.985** 149.15** 0.161** 0.143* 
  686.319 3.889 47.66 0.056 0.103 
       
N 169540 164756 168250 111596 84567 
Number of groups 69 67 67 54 51 
       
Random effects parameters      
Country  2.153 1.16 1.25 0.668 0.946 
ICC 0.585 0.29 0.322 0.119 0.214 
**P value < .001; * P value < .05 
Notes: Religious reference group is Islam; Results in odds ratios; ICC is the intra-class correlation 
of the two levels; Standard errors are in italics under coefficients  
 
As can be seen from Table 1, we found that membership in religious organization has been 
positively related to signing a petition only. The conditional odds ratios for members of religious 
organizations from the same state (or states with identical random effects) signing petition is 
1.067, holding other individual level factors constant. The models of demonstrations, strikes, 
and building occupations revealed a negative, relationship between these forms of political 
participation and membership in a religious organization. However, the relationship between 
occupation and signing a petition is negative, but it is statistically insignificant.  
When we further examine the impact of religion on political participation across different 
religious affiliations, we note an even greater diversity of findings. Noting that the results are 
relative to Muslim respondents, we find that Christian respondents are more likely to sign 
petitions, join boycotts and participate in demonstrations, ceteris paribus. We also find that 
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Catholics, relative to Muslims, have a higher odds ratio of participating in petitions, boycotts, 
demonstrations, strikes, and occupations. Relative to Muslims, Catholics have a 1.4 higher 
conditional odds ratio of signing petitions, holding other factors constant. Buddhists, as 
expected, also are more likely to participate in all forms of political participation, relative to 
Muslims. Coefficients are positive and highly significant across models.  
The results indicate that there is no support for our hypothesis that higher levels of religiosity 
are associated with higher levels of political participation. The religiosity index is statistically 
significant across models, but it is negatively associated with all forms of political participation. 
This suggests that more religious individuals are less likely to sign petitions, take part in 
boycotts and demonstrations, or occupy buildings, holding other factors constant.  
As expected, political party membership is consistently positively associated with all forms of 
political participation, and this finding is highly statistically significant in all models. 
Interestingly, people who express high levels of political interest are less likely to engage 
politically (the negative statistically significant relationship is found across all models). Also 
consistent with expectations, higher levels of life satisfactions (and, by extension, the lower 
levels of grievances) are associated with lesser odds ratios of individuals’ engagement in all 
forms of political activity, except for fighting, but the latter finding is statistically insignificant. 
Financial satisfaction, on the other hand, has a varied relationship with different forms of 
political participation. Higher levels of financial satisfactions are associated with greater odds 
ratios of signing petition, but lesser odds ratios for demonstrations, occupations, and strikes.  
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Age appears to be negatively associated with all forms of political actions. This is perhaps due 
to what Putnam (2001) called a generational change, the results indicate that younger people 
are less likely to participate in all forms of political actions relative to older people. Priorities of 
involvement, perhaps, have not reached the younger demographic. However, marital status is 
positively associated with all forms of political participation with the exception of occupation 
and strikes.   
With regards to the country-level variables, the higher levels of GDP per capita are associated 
with lesser odds ratios of individuals signing petitions, or joining boycotts. The higher levels of 
democracy are associated with lesser likelihood of individuals from these states signing 
petitions, joining boycotts, or participating in strikes. Lastly, the Emancipatory Rights Index was 
found to be negatively associated with demonstrations, strikes, and occupations. In other 
words, the higher the country’s level respect for a variety of civil and political freedoms, 
including the freedoms of movement and religion, the less likely individuals from these states 
would engage in these forms of political participation. 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we used the second measure of religiosity – the 
Importance of God scale, to test the models (see appendix). The results are overall consistent 
with the findings reported above.  
 
Post estimation 
Given that this study uses binary multilevel models, post-estimation is to be expected to further 
explain the results.  
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The graphs represent the predicted probabilities of participation, by religion for the various 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Graph 5: Predictive Margins of Occupations, by Religion with 95% CIs
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Table 1, you will observe that predicted probabilities are still calculated for all religions. Just 
because a variable is not statistically significant, it does not mean it is unimportant or actually 
equal to zero.  
At first glance, Graph 1 indicates that members of the Jewish faith have the highest predicted 
probability (approximately 0.52) of signing petitions, whereas Muslims have the lowest 
predicted probability (approximately 0.2) of signing petitions. However, as can be observed, all 
the confidence intervals overlap, suggesting that these religions are not truly unique in their 
predicted probability.  
In Graph 2, we can see that there is greater variation in predicted probabilities of boycotting. 
While none of the confidence intervals have confidence intervals that do not overlap, the 
variation is more stark than in Graph 1. Interestingly, all the religions predicted probability of 
boycotting are below zero.   
Graph 3 looks more like Graph 1, as we see that all the confidence intervals overlapping. 
However, we can note that Muslims have the lowest predicted probability of demonstrating, 
relative to Jewish people, who have the highest predicted probability. This is interesting 
because many Muslim states face authoritarian regimes, and we would consequently expect 
Muslims to avoid demonstrations as they are frowned upon (Fish, 2002). 
Graphs 4 and 5 both convey all values below zero, suggesting that for both striking and 
occupations, all religions are averse.  
These predicted probabilities present a slightly varied image than Table 1, as the diversity 
among religions is shown to be present, but limited.  
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Discussion and conclusion 
This study was motivated by an observed gap in the study of religion and various types of 
individual political participation. Although the last three decades witnessed a renewed interest 
in the study of religion in comparative politics and international relations, the scholarly 
attention has largely concentrated on the topic of religious violence inspired by the explosive 
growth of fundamentalist movements in some of the world’s largest faiths – Christianity, 
Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam in particular (Gill, 2001). With the exception of analyses of the 
impact of religion on political attitudes and behavior conducted at the individual level, the 
studies of religious influences on public policies, institutions, and the long-term outcomes (e.g., 
regime type and durability) have been performed using state-level data. Furthermore, much of 
the research on religious commitment and how it affects individual’s political attitudes and 
behavior has been conducted on the case of the United States. Religious influences in other 
national contexts are far less clean (Grzymala-Busse, 2012).  
What we found was that religion matters, but not always in the ways we expected it to have an 
impact on political participation. Notwithstanding the denominational differences, our research 
showed that religiosity, by itself, often serves as a deterrent rather than mobilizing force for 
non-violent political engagement, everything else being equal. It is the membership in political 
parties that make individuals more consistently politically active.  
Although the hierarchical models used in this study tapped the variation in the religious and 
other impacts across states by allowing their intercepts vary (the models with random slopes 
did not perform better than those with random intercepts only), they did not delve into 
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important differences within religions as well as the variation in religious influences within 
states. Not all religiosity and not all religions are the same. Doctrinal differences differentiate 
one religion from another. Much like nationalism and political ideology, the doctrinal beliefs 
will drive the behavior of faithful in different directions depending on what people believe and 
way.  
To probe the consequence of doctrinal differences on political participation, we singled out 
several of the world’s largest religions and examined how individuals’ self-identification with 
those faiths affected their willingness to engage politically. One the one hand, these analyses 
offered several insights supporting findings of previous research, for example, Glazier (2015) 
finds that, in general, non-religious people are more likely to participate in politics. She also 
finds, however, that this changes after religious leaders make appeals (Glazier, 2015). While 
this study accounts for religiosity as identified by volunteered information, it does not account 
for religious leaders’ influence. This is mainly due to the information would be difficult to 
measure, or collect, but it is a weakness of the study that we need to acknowledge. 
Religions also differ in their professions about legitimate political authority and institutional 
structures, which affect how religious authorities relate to political regimes and policies and 
how they mobilize their faithful (Philpott 2007, 505). The ways in which Catholic organizations 
and members interface with politics are shaped significantly by the hierarchical structure of the 
Catholic Church, which translates into ideological monopoly and authority to define official 
teachings across its entire global infrastructure. Evangelicals and Protestants, on the other 
hand, have a greater diversity of religious views but share a belief in the corruptive influence of 
politics. These differences affect the degree and type of influence that the members of these 
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faiths seek to exert on politics (Heyer and Rozell 2008, 2). Our study, for example, found that 
Evangelicals, like Catholics, were more likely to engage in most forms of political participation. 
Moreover, as other studies have shown, political behavior cannot be inferred from religious 
beliefs or membership in religious organizations alone. Religion interacts with secular structures 
and pressures to move or deter the individuals from engaging with the political world. In 
examining the relationship between religion and politics, we, therefore, need to be sensitive 
both to the independent roles played by religious factors and to the interactions between 
religious influences and a range of non-religious considerations and strategic evaluations 














This dissertation sought to introduce an improved terrorism dataset, provide statistical 
evidence in support of the diversity among terrorist groups, present theoretical explanations 
connecting terrorist group-types and operational decisions, and to examine the role of religion, 
religiosity, and other social factors on various forms of political participation. I believe that the 
three articles presented have fulfilled these goals.  
The first article sought to examine the link between ideology and tactic choice. An enhanced 
version of the GTD was developed in order to test this question. Groups were systematically 
assigned an ideological identity, or two in some cases, and each group’s length of survival was 
also recorded. The five ideological categories are: nationalist/separatist, left wing, right wing, 
religious, and environmental. The new dataset allowed me to test the role of ideology and 
capability on the selection of six different tactics, including bombing, armed assaults, 
kidnappings, barricading, assassination, and hijackings. I find that there is indeed diversity of 
choices based on ideologies. I also find mixed answers to Rapaport’s “waves of terrorism” 
theory. Given the time limitations of the data, I was only able to test Rapoport’s expectations 
for the third (leftist) and fourth (religious) waves. Rapoport’s expectations, at times, meet up 
with his expectations. However, the key contributions of this piece are: (1) an enhanced dataset 
to test terrorism questions at the group-level, (2) finding answers to the waves of terrorism 
theory, and (3) statistical evidence of diversity among ideological group-types with regards to 
tactic choice.  
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The data introduced in the first article, and the consequent findings, suggest that future studies 
need to take more care in understanding the variation among groups. The dataset may be used 
to test a multitude of theories, and it will allow scholars to incorporate the group level 
dynamics.  
The second article, like the first, sought to further understand a specific operational decision, 
namely target choice. This article argues that ideology is the driving force of operational 
decisions, and these decisions are mitigated by capability. This article detailed the role of 
ideology and how a group identity can shape decisions. This article contributes to the literature 
as it shows that ideology is a compelling force for target selection as it provides empirical 
evidence conveying the diversity among group-types selection of targets.  
Moreover, the first and second articles both have implications for counter-terrorism. The 
articles’ find evidence of trends regarding tactic and target selection by group-types, and these 
trends can inform the distribution of resources. For instance, understanding that right wing 
groups are likely to use assassination and likely to attack political targets, helps inform 
authorities how to deal with the threat of a right wing group.  
The final article, which is co-authored with Prof. Omelicheva, sought to convey the link between 
religion, religiosity, and various forms of non-violent political participation. The study addresses 
the variation among religions, and explains how that variation compels us to consider the 
differences among them. We find mixed results that are both in convergence and alignment 
with the literature; we find that political party members are more likely to participate in 
political actions, whereas we find that members of religious groups are not. We also find that 
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while there is diversity among religions in terms of their members’ participation in political 
actions, that diversity is somewhat limited, as post-estimation indicated. This study also 
suggests that when considering the role of religion on political activity, we need to consider 
other factors, including membership in political parties, membership in social groups, and 
demographic factors. In sum, religion is not a sole influencing factor on political activity.  
This dissertation also makes an additional contribution, as a whole, it contends that all political 
activity, violent or non-violent is a form of political activism. This may not be a conventional 
view, but I believe that actions are, at least in turn, motivated by grievances, and these political 
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Study 1 Appendix: 




Dependent variables   
Group-Type 
Categorical variable denoting group-types:  
(1) Nationalist/Separatist 
(2) Left wing 
(3) Right wing 
(4) Religious 
(5) Environment 
(6) Nationalist/Separatist and Religious 
(7) Nationalist/Separatist and Left wing 
All coded as “1” if they fit into their respective group-type(s) 
and “0” if not. Nationalist/separatist groups, the most 
numerous category, is the reference category. 
    
Independent 
variables   
Nationalist/Separatist
s (N/S) 
Dummy variable; "1" if the group is nationalist/separatist and "0" if 
they are not 
Left wing (LW) Dummy variable; "1" if the group is left wing and "0" if they are not 
Right wing (RW) Dummy variable; "1" if the group is right wing and "0" if they are not 
Religious ® Dummy variable; "1" if the group is religious and "0" if they are not 
Environmental € 
Dummy variable; "1" if the group is environmental and "0" if they 
are not 
Nationalist/Separatist 
& Religious (NS/R) Interaction variable; N/S * R 
Nationalist/Separatist
s & Left wing (NS/LW) Interaction variable; N/S * LW 
One year 
Dummy variable; "1" if the groups survived past one year, "0" if they 
did not 
Five years 
Dummy variable; "1" if the groups survived past five years, "0" if 
they did not 
Third wave Dummy time variable; "1" if the year is <1995, "0" otherwise  
Fourth wave Dummy time variable; "1" if the year is >1978, "0" otherwise  
Internet age Dummy time variable; "1" if the year is >1995, "0" otherwise  
Year Continuous variable, denotes years, from 1970 to 2013  
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Study 2 Appendix: 
Item 1: Variable descriptions 
  
Dependent variables   
Political target 
 
“1” if the target is political (government buildings, government 
employees, government events, and foreign missions or embassies), 




 “1” if the target is civilian (educational institutions such as schools or 
teachers, journalists and media entities, NGOs, private citizens and 
private property, religious institutions, and tourists), “0” if otherwise 
Security target “1” if target is a security body (military or police), “0” otherwise 
Business target 




“1” if the target is a rival (other terrorist groups or non-state 




“1” if the target is an infrastructure target (food or water supplies, 
airports, maritime facilities like ports or ships, cell phone towers, 
transportation systems and utility facilities like oil pipelines or 
electric substations), “0” otherwise 
Independent 












Categorical variable denoting group-types:  
(1) Nationalist/Separatist 
(2) Left wing 
(3) Right wing 
(4) Religious 
(5) Environment 
(6) Nationalist/Separatist and Religious 
(7) Nationalist/Separatist and Left wing 
All coded as “1” if they fit into their respective group-type(s) and “0” 
if not. Nationalist/separatist groups, the most numerous category, is 
the reference category. 
One year 
Dummy variable; "1" if the groups survived past one year, "0" if they 
did not 
Five years 
Dummy variable; "1" if the groups survived past five years, "0" if they 
did not 







Study 3 Appendix:  
Item 1: 
















A survey item that asked respondents to indicate 
whether they signed a petition (yes=1; no=0)  
A survey item that asked respondents to indicate 
whether they joined in boycotts yes=1; no=0)  
A survey item that asked respondents to indicate 
whether they attended lawful demonstrations yes=1; 
no=0)  
  
A survey item that asked respondents to indicate 
whether they joined unofficial strikes yes=1; no=0)  
  
Religiosity   Religiosity1  
  
Religiosity2  
An additive scale ranging from 0 (not religious at all) to 3 
(very religious)  
A survey item measuring the importance of God in one’s 
life, which runs from 1 to 10 with higher values indicating 
more importance of God in respondent’s life  
Religious 
Affiliation   









Dummy variables with “1” if respondent chose Muslim, 
Christian, Buddhist, Evangelical Christian, Hindu, Jew, 
Orthodox, Protestant, or Catholic as his/her religious 
denomination. The religion variable included takes these 
dummies and a categorical variable is created. 1 = 
Muslim, 2=Christian, 3=Buddhists, 4=Evangelicals, 
5=Hindus, 6=Jewish, 7=Orthodox, 8=Protestant, and 







A survey item asking about respondent’s membership in 
religious organization (yes=1, no=0)  
Motive for 
political 




financial situation   
A survey item asking respondents to indicate how 
satisfied they were with their life  
A survey asking about respondent’s satisfaction with the 
financial situation in his/her household. Both items are 
measured on a scale from 1 (“completely dissatisfied”) to   
10 (completely satisfied”).  
Political  
Opportunity   
Membership in 
political party  
Survey item asking about a respondent’s membership in 




 Membership in  






Perception of the 
freedom of choice 
and control  
A binary variable denoting membership in one or more 
of the following voluntary associations: humanitarian or 
charitable organizations, education or art groups, trade 
unions, organizations concerned with human rights, 
environmentalist or animal welfare groups, youth work, 
sport or recreational groups, consumer groups, 
professional associations, and other voluntary groups.  A 
survey item asking a respondent to assess how much 
freedom of choice and control over his/her life he/she 
has (10= a great deal; 0=none).  
Incentive for 
political 
participation   
Political interest  
  
Political regime   
Empowerment  
Rights Index  
The scale of importance of politics in one’s life:  1 (very 
important) to 4 (not at all)  
Polity score  
An additive index constructed from seven indicators of 
the freedoms of Foreign Movement, Domestic  
Movement, Speech, Religion, Assembly & Association,  
Workers’ Rights, and Electoral Self-Determination. 
Ranges from 0 (no government respects for these rights) 
to 14 (full government respect for these rights).  
Other   Age  
Marital status  
GDP per capita  
Respondent’s age  
Respondent’s marital status  

















Table 2: Political participation with Importance of God index 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
 Petition Boycott Demonstrate Strike Occupy 
Importance of God  0.905**  0.854**  0.915**  0.844**  0.863** 
   0.009  0.008  0.008  0.01  0.014 
Life satisfaction  0.99  0.978**  0.988*  0.969**  0.966** 
   0.004  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.007 
Importance of politics  0.702**  0.695**  0.686**  0.714**  0.734** 
   0.006  0.006  0.005  0.007  0.011 
Religious membership  1.107**  1.008  0.989  0.983  0.997 
   0.026  0.023  0.021  0.029  0.041 
Political party member  1.937**  1.771**  1.933**  1.643**  1.574** 
   0.071  0.057  0.064  0.065  0.082 
Other memberships  1.159**  1.334**  1.451**  1.494**  1.31** 
   0.034  0.0427  0.041  0.056  0.062 
Perception of freedom of 
choice  1.021**  1.016**  1.019**  1.025**  1.005 
   0.003  0.004  0.003  0.005  0.006 
Christian  1.348  1.23  1.839*  1.11  0.592 
   0.313  0.322  0.423  0.571  0.673 
Buddhist  1.945**  1.432**  1.516**  1.394**  1.951** 
   0.14  0.977  0.097  0.132 0.317 
Evangelical  1.348**  0.858*  1.017  0.935  0.834 
   0.098  0.066  0.069  (0.108  0.127 
Hindu  1.162*  1.093  0.97  0.921  0.761* 
   (0.079  0.079  0.065  0.086  0.103 
Jewish  1.859**  2.102**  1.638**  2.249**  1.408 
   0.279  0.279  0.208  0.339  0.319 
Orthodox Christian  1.464**  1.134*  1.439**  1.311**  1.152 
   0.063  0.052  0.06  0.077  0.119 
Protestant   1.59**  1.192**  1.189**  1.085  0.903 
   0.07  0.052  0.048  0.063  0.085 
Catholic  1.4**  1.131*  1.235**  1.147*  1.111 
   0.057  0.047  0.047  0.063  0.096 
Financial satisfaction  1.006  0.996  0.98**  0.981*  0.979* 
   0.004  0.004  0.003  0.0005  0.007 
Age  0.987**  0.984**  0.984**  0.978**  0.976** 
   .0004  0.0005  0.0005  0.0007  0.001 
Married 1.093**  1.013  1.01  0.922**  0.88** 
   0.018  0.016  0.149  0.018  0.027 
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GDP per capita (logged  0.434**  0.684**  0.479**  1.307**  1.71** 
   0.02  0.036  0.021  0.051  0.176 
Polity score  0.982**  0.979**  1.003  1.056**  0.956** 
   0.005  0.006  0.005  0.007  0.013 
Emancipatory index  0.979*  0.996  0.932**  0.921**  0.875** 
   0.008  0.009  0.008  0.01  0.022 
Constant  7251.31**  73.238**  3762.258**  0.308*  0.06** 
   3666.205  37.057  1686.856  0.126  0.047 
            
N  99676  97207  99571  66067  47696 
Number of groups  68  66  66  54  50 
            
Random effects parameters           
Country   2.341  1.421  1.709  0.688  0.952 
ICC  0.625  0.38  0.47  0.126  0.216 
** P value < .001; * P value < .05 
Notes: Religious reference group is Islam; Results in odds ratios; ICC is the intra-class correlation 
of the two levels; Standard errors are in italics under coefficients  
 
